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1.1 Motivation and objectives
The valuation of firms is one of the topics that valuation theorists and practitioners have ad-
dressed since the early stages of economic sciences. Firm valuations are conducted regularly
using discounted cash flow (DCF) models, in which expected cash flows are discounted at cap-
ital-market-based cost of capital. In this regard, one of corporate finance’s fundamental insights
is that, under debt financing, the consideration of corporate taxes enhances the equity market
value (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963). Besides corporate taxes, there is a prevailing consen-
sus that personal taxes also matter when determining the equity market value, because cash
dividends are taxed differently than capital gains (e.g., Miller, 1977; Dempsey, 1996). Hence,
overall, the consideration of taxes in valuation models is a much-discussed topic and builds the
core of this thesis.
Since the seminal studies by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963), it has become evident that
debt financing provides tax shields due to the corporate tax deductibility of interests. The rele-
vant cost of capital to discount these tax shields for determining their market value is closely
related to the riskiness of the firm’s debt. Thus, a firm’s financing policy needs to be considered
further as it specifies how the firm determines its debt levels. In this respect, most valuation
literature refers implicitly or explicitly to the following two pure financing policies: passive
debt management and active debt management. Passive debt management is characterized by
predetermined debt levels, whereas active debt management sets deterministic capital structure
targets for future periods (Miles & Ezzell, 1980, 1985; Harris & Pringle, 1985). Thus, under
passive debt management, debt levels are set independently of future developments, while, un-
der active debt management, debt levels are adjusted in each period to the current firm values
to adhere to the predetermined capital structure targets. As a result, the tax shields’ appropriate
cost of capital is, generally, lower under passive debt management than under the active one.
Consequently, the equity market value is generally higher under passive debt management.
Therefore, the choice of financing policy has an influence on the level of equity market value.
Besides the two above-mentioned pure financing policies, there also exist other financing pol-
icies to be considered, such as those that represent a combination of passive and active debt
management (e.g., Dierkes & Schäfer, 2016; Ruback, 2002), are based on book values (e.g.,
Fernandez, 2008; Scholze, 2008), or are cash flow oriented (e.g., Kruschwitz & Löffler, 2006).
Note that each of these financing policies generally has different implications for the appropri-
ate discount rate of the tax shields. In this respect, this thesis only considers passive and active
debt managements, as they represent the two most referenced financing policies in valuation
literature and practice.
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In both prior literature and corporate valuation practice, it is agreed that, besides corporate
taxes, personal taxes also matter when determining the equity market value (e.g., Heintzen et
al., 2008; Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer [IDW], 2008). However, it is not feasible to account for
each individual personal tax regime in valuation models, which is mainly due to information
restrictions. Thus, most valuation literature including personal taxes refers implicitly or explic-
itly to a representative equity and debt investor (e.g., Dempsey, 2017). In principle, equity in-
vestors are obligated to pay taxes on received cash dividends and realized capital gains, whereas
debt investors pay taxes on received interests. The consideration of a cash dividend and an
interest tax rate in valuation models is rather straightforward. Particularly, it proves a problem
of accounting for the capital gains tax rate, whereby it is commonly assumed that capital gains
correspond to changes in market values in DCF models (e.g., Clubb & Doran, 1992). The prob-
lem of accounting for the capital gains tax rate arises because investments in shares are usually
long term, and thus the corresponding capital gains taxes are, normally, not realized immedi-
ately. Accordingly, capital gains taxes can be deferred, thereby leading to a tax advantage when
compared with the taxes payable on cash dividends (Bailey, 1969; Amoako-Adu, 1983; Wiese,
2007; Brealey et al., 2017). Consequently, the tax rate on effective capital gains to be used in
DCF models is lower than that on cash dividends. 1
The differentiated consideration of the personal taxation of equity investors allows accounting
for the firm’s dividend policy. Dividend policy is defined as the decision about how much of
the cash flow available for distribution is distributed to equity investors and how much is re-
tained by the firm. The distributed cash flow is taxed at the cash dividend tax rate, while the
retained cash flow is taxed at the effective capital gains tax rate. Thus, equity market value
increases the more a firm engages in retaining cash flows, because the tax rate on cash dividends
exceeds the effective capital gains tax rate. Hence, dividend policy, in addition to the financing
policy, affects the level of equity market value (Miller & Modigliani, 1961; Rashid & Amoako-
Adu, 1987, 1995; Dempsey, 2001; Scholze, 2008; Kuhner & Maltry, 2017). In this context,
most valuation literature refers to a relatively simple dividend policy, which assumes the full
distribution of cash flows to equity investors (residual dividend policy; e.g., Clubb & Doran,
1992; Dempsey, 2001; Diedrich & Dierkes, 2015). Moreover, further strategies when determin-
ing dividends might be considered, such as a yield-oriented or value-based dividend policy
(Diedrich & Dierkes, 2017).
In this thesis, we abstract from the assumption of the residual dividend policy. This policy might
not reflect the reality, as managers hold back cash flows for additional investments and exploit
the personal tax advantage of retained cash flows over cash dividends. Accounting for this fact,
it may be more appropriate to expect that only a certain percentage ratio of the available cash
flow is distributed to equity investors, and the residual is retained by the firm (earnings-based
1 In this regard, the effective capital gains tax rate is often set as equal to half of the cash dividend tax rate.
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dividend policy).2 In this case, assumptions are needed about the use of retained cash flows by
the firm. Regarding this, two approaches are usually considered. Previous German literature
often assumes that the retained cash flows are invested in investment projects whose value con-
tributions equal the initial invested cash flows. Consequently, considerable research has been
conducted on the return by which these investments remain value-neutral (e.g., Tschöpel et al.,
2010). Conversely, international literature assumes that retained cash flows are used for share
repurchases (Rashid & Amoako-Adu, 1987, 1995). It must be noted that the personal tax im-
plications of cash flow investments in value-neutral projects and of share repurchases are the
same, because they are both subject to the effective capital gains tax rate.
Theoretical research in the area of corporate valuation is often concerned with deriving appro-
priate adjustment formulas for the relationship between the firm’s unlevered and levered costs
of equity. This is mainly motivated by the fact that, in principle, closed-form mathematical
solutions are derived that enable high comparability and interpretability. Consistent and theo-
retically sound derivations of adjustment formulas are especially important, as the cost of the
equity level has a high impact on the ultimate firm value, which becomes particularly obvious
when calculating the firm’s terminal value. Additionally, adjustment formulas build the core
for the unlevering and relevering of beta factors in corporate valuation practice. Besides the
financing policy, dividend policy, and personal taxes, the adjustment formulas depend on other
contributing factors, namely, the forecast horizon and assumed default risk of debt. In this re-
spect, the forecast horizon is usually split into an explicit forecast period and a subsequent
steady state. In an explicit forecast period, the expected cash flows are determined based on
detailed calculations, whereas in a steady state, they increase at a constant growth rate. Regard-
ing the default risk of debt, this thesis generally simplifies it by assuming that the debt is risk-
free.
Overall, the present thesis further develops the valuation literature regarding the integration of
personal taxes and dividend policy in valuation models. A problem of special interest is the
simultaneous consideration of the financing and dividend policy of the firm under corporate
and personal taxes. This problem is recognized by several other authors, such as Fama and
French (1998), who state in one of their prestigious studies, “In short, good estimates of how
tax treatment of dividend and debt affect the cost of capital and firm value are a high priority
for research in corporate finance” (p. 819). Cooper and Nyborg (2004) concur with this by
stressing that “A common source of confusion and disagreement in corporate finance is the
effect of taxes on valuation and rates of return” (p. 2). In light of Fama and French’s research
call and the ongoing uncertainties about the effect of taxes on valuation, this thesis aims to
provide a number of new insights by developing consistent and theoretically sound valuation
2 Accordingly, the residual dividend policy can be seen as a special case of an earnings-based dividend
policy.
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models that account for the firm’s financing and dividend policy. To achieve this, we conduct
four studies. Figure 1 summarizes the objectives and structure of the thesis.
Figure 1: Objectives of the thesis.
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1.2 Content
This thesis proceeds as follows. It comprises four studies on firm valuation under different
financing and dividend policies in consideration of personal taxes. The first study examines the
terminal value calculation with a constant payout ratio under active debt management (Chapter
2). The second study investigates the valuation with share repurchases and personal taxes
(Chapter 3). The third study refers to the development of valuation models, accounting for the
dividend policy and passive debt management (Chapter 4). The fourth study examines the val-
uation error when applying the “wrong” adjustment formula (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 concludes.
Study 1:  Terminal value calculation with constant payout ratio and active debt management
(Chapter 2)
The terminal value of a firm accounts for a high proportion of the ultimate firm value and thus
should be calculated carefully. Hence, the first study begins by presenting the characteristics
underlying the steady state. Subsequently, the valuation models of the flow to equity (FtE) and
free cash flow (FCF) approaches are determined under a residual dividend policy and active
debt management. Then, the study analyzes the changes that result if cash flows are retained.
Specifically, it is seen that even under the assumption of value-neutral investments, firm value
increases due to the difference between the effective capital gains tax rate and cash dividend
tax rate. Under active debt management, this tax-based value increase leads to an additional
debt financing to ensure adherence to the predetermined capital structure target. This additional
debt financing implies additional interests, tax shields, and changes in the debt market value,
which affect different parts of the valuation model. In this context, the corporate valuation
standard IDW S 1 refers to a study by Tschöpel et al. (2010), whose valuation model does not
account for the additional debt financing effects resulting from the assumption of active debt
management. By using simulations, it is shown that the value contribution of the earnings-based
dividend policy is overestimated by more than 25%, on average, when applying the valuation
model by Tschöpel et al. (2010).
Study 2:  Valuation with share repurchases and personal taxes
(Chapter 3)
The second study considers that share repurchases have become an important alternative for
distributing cash flows to equity investors. Therefore, it starts by developing the unlevered
firm’s valuation model if cash dividends and share repurchases occur in the same period, as-
suming an explicit forecast period and a subsequent steady state. Particularly, it is shown that
firm value increases with an increase in the firm’s participation in share repurchases, which is
attributed to the tax advantage that share repurchases provide when compared with cash divi-
dends. In the following section, the valuation model of a levered firm is solved under active
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debt management by accounting for additional debt financing effects, which were revealed in
the first study. The derived valuation model follows the FtE approach. Subsequently, the impact
of share repurchases on the cost of equity is depicted by deriving adjustment formulas, follow-
ing the different debt adjustment assumptions by Miles and Ezzell (1980, 1985) and Harris and
Pringle (1985). It is worth noting that share repurchases have no impact on the underlying cost
of equity in the Harris and Pringle case. This is not the case regarding the debt adjustment
assumptions of Miles and Ezzell. Eventually, by using simulations, it is demonstrated that a
valuation model that only assumes cash dividends significantly underestimates the equity mar-
ket value when compared with a valuation model that considers both cash dividends and share
repurchases.
Study 3:  Valuation, taxes, and dividend policy under passive debt management
(Chapter 4)
Contrary to the first and second studies, which assume active debt management, the third study
assumes passive debt management. It starts by developing the unlevered firm’s valuation model
accounting for a firm’s dividend policy by assuming an explicit forecast period and a steady
state. Then, the levered firm’s valuation model is derived according to the FtE approach. Spe-
cifically, the valuation model includes a blended personal tax rate encapsulating all the effects
resulting from retentions and cash dividends. In existing literature, how this blended tax rate is
determined and how dividend policy affects this tax rate generally remains open. Subsequently,
the impact of dividend policy on the cost of equity is disclosed by deriving adjustment formulas
for an explicit forecast period and steady state. Practitioners should note that the unlevering of
beta factors assuming a steady state requires information about the cash dividend ratios of the
reference companies. Eventually, relevance of the derived valuation model is emphasized by
using simulations. Depending on the level of the cash dividend ratio, the average valuation
underestimation is approximately 7.6% when compared with a valuation model, which assumes
full distribution of the available cash flows to equity investors under otherwise identical as-
sumptions.
Study 4:  Unlevering and Relevering with “wrong” adjustment formulas – How bad is that?
(Chapter 5)
Contrary to the other three studies, this study is written in German. The study will demonstrate
which valuation errors occur if the adjustment formula used in valuation models does not reflect
the actual valuation case. In this respect, the corporate valuation standard IDW S 1 refers to
Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) adjustment formula, which is only suitable if the firm pursues
passive debt management and has reached a steady state in which new investments equivalent
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to the depreciations are undertaken. Moreover, the valuation practice often accounts for per-
sonal taxes only in the numerator of DCF models and uses pre-personal tax adjustment formulas
for determining the cost of capital. Therefore, the fourth study first depicts the correct adjust-
ment formulas based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) depending on the forecast
horizon, financing policy, incorporation of personal taxes, and default risk of debt. Subse-
quently, the valuation error is highlighted by using simulations when the “wrong” adjustment
formula applies. Results of the simulations show that severe valuation errors can occur if the
adjustment formula does not match the actual valuation case. Thus, valuation practitioners
should be more conscious about which adjustment formula to use.
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2 Terminal value calculation with constant payout ratio
and active debt management
Ralf Diedrich, Stefan Dierkes, Evelyn Raths, and Johannes Sümpelmann
Abstract
Due to the possible deferral of capital gains taxes, retaining earnings provide a tax advantage
compared to distributing them. Because of this, the calculation of the terminal value is often
based on the assumption of an exogenously determined payout ratio. The present study consid-
ers this assumption and develops a valuation model for the case in which the firm pursuits an
active debt management, that is, adopts a financing policy based on market values. The terminal
value is determined under both free cash flow and flow to equity approaches. Overall, it is
shown that the valuation formula used in standard practice does not take into account all the
financial effects caused by the retention of earnings. A simulation of the valuation error high-
lights that the value contribution of the dividend policy is overestimated by more than 25% on
average. This result points out the need to carefully rethink the currently employed approaches
to terminal value calculation.
Keywords: Valuation, terminal value, dividend policy, constant payout ratio, financing
policy
JEL Classification: G32, H20, M41
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2.1 Introduction
Theorists and practitioners have dealt with terminal value calculation since the early stages of
the applied valuation theory. All relevant studies implicitly or explicitly assume that the valua-
tion object reaches a steady state at the end of the explicit forecast period. In the steady state,
the expected free cash flow and the expected values of all other relevant variables such as EBIT
and capital expenditures increase at a constant and uniform growth rate (Aders & Schröder,
2004; Penman, 2013; Koller et al., 2015). Recently, considerable attention has been paid to
whether the dividend policy in the steady state is accurately taken into account. The issue arises
because the tax system in many countries (e.g., Germany) results in a tax advantage of retained
earnings over dividends. Consequently, the market value of the firm increases with the propor-
tion of retained earnings, provided that the value effect of additional investments equals at least
the invested amount. Because of this, a full distribution of available earnings is not plausible.
The dividend policy emerges as a potential tool to actively increase the shareholder value. This
idea gains even more significance as dividend policy is also an important instrument to persuade
external investors of the business model sustainability (signaling) (e.g., Kruschwitz & Löffler,
2006; Brealey et al., 2017; and Berk & DeMarzo, 2017).
As the dividend policy in the explicit forecast period is simultaneously determined with the
investment and financing policy, the analysis of the steady state requires some simplifying as-
sumptions. As a result, only part of the expected earnings translates into dividends. Earnings
are held back for two purposes. First, due to inflation, the price of investment goods increases,
and earnings are partly used for reinvestments. As a consequence, the balance sheet total in-
creases whereas capacities remain constant, which indicates an inflation-based growth. Second,
earnings are used to build up capacity. This also produces an increase in the balance sheet total,
indicating the real firm growth. In both cases, the foregoing dividends represent a financial
contribution of shareholders, complemented by additional debt financing in order to maintain
the intended capital structure if the firm pursuits an active debt management. Together, infla-
tion-based and real growth build up the nominal growth rate at which all relevant figures in-
crease (Friedl & Schwetzler, 2010; Penman, 2013).
We define a residual dividend policy as the full distribution of earnings after all investments
are carried out in the above sense. Given this policy, in the steady state the expected dividends
make up a constant proportion of expected earnings. However, if this proportion is higher than
the usual dividend payout ratio in the industry, even more earnings might be retained to exploit
the tax advantage of retained earnings over dividends. As a consequence, a lower proportion of
earnings compared to a residual dividend policy is distributed to shareholders (earnings-based
dividend policy). In this case, additional assumptions on the investments financed by the addi-
tional retained earnings are clearly needed. The simplest assumption is that these investments
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remain value neutral, that is, the value contribution of the additional investment equals the ini-
tial invested amount (IDW, 2008, 2014). If taxes on dividends are higher than those on capital
gains, the additional earnings retention leads to a tax advantage for shareholders, resulting in a
higher market value of the firm in prior periods even if the market value at the time of invest-
ment remains unaffected.
The present study considers a valuation model to investigate the effects of additional earnings
retention. Although the main focus is on the flow to equity approach, which is often used in
practice of valuation, the consequences for the terminal value calculation are also derived with
regard to the free cash flow approach, which allows valuation in this case without circularity
problems. It is assumed that the firm reaches a steady state at the end of the explicit forecast
period and pursuits an active debt management. Thus, the theoretical setting is in line with the
existing literature. The problem of special interest is the relationship between the dividend and
the financing policy. Under active debt management and earnings-based dividend policy, the
additional retained earnings lead to a debt financing adjustment. This in turn causes effects that
have not been examined thoroughly in the literature so far. Against this background, the central
result of this study is a valuation model that includes these effects consistently. In order to
illustrate the relevance of our results, we perform a simulation analysis to estimate the average
valuation error by applying the standard terminal value formula. Specifically, it is shown that
the personal tax advantage of an earnings-based dividend policy is overestimated by more than
25%. As for the total terminal value, the overestimation amounts to 2% on average and to a
maximum of 5%. Due to the high proportion of the terminal value to the total market value of
the firm, the effect should not be ignored.
The literature dealing with terminal value calculation is variegated. By deriving the formula for
the valuation of a uniformly increasing cash flow, Gordon and Shapiro (1956) provide a starting
point. Bradley and Jarrell (2008, 2011) and Friedl and Schwetzler (2009, 2010, 2011) consider
inflation-based and real growth in a valuation model without personal taxes. The literature most
closely related to our study has been developed since 2000 (Wagner et al., 2004, 2006; Wiese,
2005; Schwetzler, 2005; Meitner, 2008). This literature stream tends to assume a predetermined
payout ratio in the steady state and value neutrality of additional investments. Most studies aim
to identify the rate of return that keeps additional investments value neutral (Wagner et al.,
2006; Tschöpel et al., 2010; Pawelzik, 2010). Other contributions directly assume value neu-
trality of additional investments without questioning the rate of return (Diedrich, 2013). Highly
relevant for practitioners is the Standard IDW S 1, which requires the determination of a payout
ratio based on alternative investment possibilities in the same industry. If this ratio is lower than
that from a residual dividend policy, an earnings-based dividend policy and a value neutral
investment of additional retained earnings shall be assumed. In this regard, the auditors’ hand-
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book explicitly refers to the study by Tschöpel et al. (2010), whose approach has been imple-
mented in practice. We claim that this approach does not take into account the additional fi-
nancing effects that are the object of our analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions under-
lying the steady state. Subsequently, given a residual dividend policy and an active debt man-
agement, the valuation model under both the flow to equity and the free cash flow approach is
determined, whereby inflation-based and real growth constitute the nominal growth rate. The
consequences of additional retained earnings are analyzed for one period in Section 3. In Sec-
tion 4, a valuation model where additional retained earnings are made in each period of the
steady state is derived. Based on this model, the relevant valuation model under the flow to
equity and the free cash flow approach is derived. In Section 5, the practical relevance of the
derived valuation model is illustrated through simulations, and the differences between our
model and the standard terminal value formula are pointed out. Section 6 concludes by summa-
rizing the most relevant results.
2.2 Terminal value calculation with a residual dividend policy
We assume that the valuation object reaches a steady state at the end of the explicit forecast
period, in which the firm undertakes replacement and expansion investments. These invest-
ments lead to a constant increase of all relevant parameters.3 With nominal net investments in
period t , tNI , we obtain the book value of the invested capital tIC
t t 1 tIC IC NI,< ∗ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ , (1)
where period T  indicates the beginning of the steady state phase. The free cash flow tFCF  is
defined as:
t t tFCF NOPLAT NI< , , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ . (2)
tNOPLAT  is the net operating profit less adjusted taxes (NOPLAT) in period t , which includes
the taxes of the unlevered firm. The operating profit tOP  corresponds to the difference between
NOPLAT and the debt interest tI , plus the tax shield tTS :
t t t tOP NOPLAT I TS< , ∗ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ .  (3)
3 For the description of the steady state see Aders and Schröder (2004), Koller et al. (2015), and Diedrich
and Dierkes (2015), as well as Penman (2013) and Friedl and Schwetzler (2010).
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The debt interest tI corresponds to the product of the cost of debt kd , which is constant in the
steady state, and the market value of debt t 1D ,  at the beginning of the period. We assume that
t 1D ,  equals the debt book value in the steady state. The tax shield tTS  is calculated by multi-
plying debt interest by the corporate tax rate .4
Equations (1), (2), and (3) only provide definitions. To determine the characteristic growth of
all relevant values in the steady state, we add two assumptions. First, the expected net invest-
ments, which are necessary for an inflation-based and a real growth, is assumed to make up a
constant proportion n  of the expected NOPLAT:
° ±[ ] [ ]t tE NI E NOPLAT n< √ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ .  (4)
Second, we assume that the NOPLAT reflects a constant return on the invested capital (ROIC):
± °[ ] [ ]t t 1E NOPLAT ROIC E IC ,< √ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ .  (5)
Note that the two assumptions are formulated in terms of expectations. Thus, the constant ROIC
in (5) does not necessarily correspond to the ROIC obtained in the subsequent period. In addi-
tion, a different proportion n  of the realized NOPLAT could be used for net investments.
Given (4) and (5), the expected free cash flow and all other relevant values increase at a constant
nominal growth rate w . Eventually, w  can be traced back to inflation and real growth:5
w ROIC n< √ (6)
Assuming a constant cost of capital, the market value of the firm increases over time at the
nominal growth rate in (6). Given the active debt management and the constant capital structure,
this growth holds also for the market value of debt. This in turn enables us to specify the ex-
pected retained earnings °[ ]tE RE   in period t :
° ° ↓[ ] [ ] [ ]t t 1tE RE E NI w E D ,< , √ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ .  (7)
The second term on the right-hand side of (7) represents the growth of the market value of debt
in period t . Deducting the retained earnings tRE  from the operating profit
r
tOP  yields the flow
to equity rtFTE :
± ° °[ ] [ ] [ ]
r r
tt tE FtE E OP E RE< , , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ .  (8)
4 We assume that the interest on debt is fully deductible from taxable income. If it is only partially deductible,
the appropriate tax rate of this tax base is used.
5 Note that ( ) ( )w ROIC n 1 g 1 1< √ < ∗ √ ∗ , , where g  is the real growth rate and  is inflation. See Diedrich
and Dierkes (2015), Penman (2013), and Friedl and Schwetzler (2010).
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The index r  indicates that the relevant values relate to the residual dividend policy. Obviously,
the expected flow to equity also grows at the growth rate w . Distributed to equity investors it
is subject to taxation at the personal rate ds .
By keeping operating risk, capital structure, and dividend policy unchanged, a constant cost of
equity ,srke
κ  is used to compute the market value of the firm. Hence, under a flow to equity
approach that accounts for personal taxes, the terminal value becomes: 6
↓




[ ] ( ) [ ] ( [ ] [ ])
[ ]
r r r r
T 1 T 1 TT 1r d g
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As we assume that capital gains reflect changes in market values, the last term in (9) defines
the capital gains taxation, where gs  depicts the effective capital gains tax rate. As the expected
market value of equity must increase at the growth rate w  ( ↓ ↓, ,[ ] ( ) [ ]r rT 1 TE E 1 w E E∗ < ∗ √
κ κ
), Equa-
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Given equation (10), it is now possible to compute the terminal value according to the flow to
equity approach. However, equation (10) entails circularity problems: the forecast of the ex-
pected flow to equity ±[ ]
r
T 1E FtE ∗  needs the forecast of the expected tax shield °[ ]
r
T 1E TS ∗  and
thereby the forecast of the expected debt market value ↓[ ]TE D . With an active debt management







, which is yet to be calculated.
To obtain the terminal value under the free cash flow approach, we consider the relationship
between the flow to equity and the free cash flow:
± ± ↓ ↓[ ] [ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]
r r
T TT 1 T 1E FtE E FCF kd E D 1 w E D∗ ∗< , √ √ , ∗ √  . (11)
The last term in (11) takes explicitly into account that the debt market value increases at the
growth rate w . This entails the necessity to issue a corresponding amount of debt in every
period. Taking into account the assumption of an active debt management, which implies
6 For discounted cash flow approaches see Ballwieser and Hachmeister (2016) and Kruschwitz and Löffler
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Equation (12) can be used to calculate the terminal value according to the free cash flow ap-
proach. The numerator comprises the free cash flow, which is distributed to investors of a fully
equity-financed firm, minus the personal tax rate on dividends. The capital gains taxation is
included in the growth rate reduction ( )gw 1 s√ ,  at the denominator. As standard in the free
cash flow approach, the effects of debt financing are fully embodied in the cost of capital. It
reflects two aspects. First, the cost of capital relates to the tax deductibility of interests, which
increases the amount that can be distributed to equity investors. Specifically, tax deductibility
is captured by the cost of debt after personal and corporate taxes,
( ) ( ) ( )s dkd 1 1 s kd 1√ , < , √ √ , . Second, debt issuance replaces a reduction in dividend pay-
ments. While the latter is tax-relevant for equity investors, debt provision has no fiscal conse-
quences for debt investors. The resulting effect is measured by the growth rate reduction
( )dw 1 s√ , . The advantage of determining the terminal value with the free cash flow approach
in (12) is that the market value at the beginning of the steady state can be calculated without
circularity problems.
2.3 Effects on value of one-time additional retained earnings
Based on the terminal value model of the previous chapter, we now investigate how results
change if we assume an earnings-based dividend policy. To illustrate the overall effects of ad-
ditional retained earnings, we firstly assume one-time additional earnings retention 1T 1x ∗  in pe-
riod T 1∗ . Thus, 1T 1x ∗  adds up to the retained earnings T 1RE ∗  in (7), which were held back
because of the financing of inflation-based and real growth. Similarly to T 1RE ∗ ,
1
T 1x ∗  serves
as an equity financial contribution for additional investments and is complemented by addi-
tional debt to maintain the capital structure constant in the steady state. In line with IDW S 1,
we assume that the additional investments do not generate additional value. Thus, 1T 1x ∗  corre-
sponds to the value increase ,1T 1E ∗








Notice that for value neutrality it is not necessary that the risk related to the additional invest-
ments corresponds to that of the existing investment program. So for example retained earnings
can be also invested in risk-free securities. Additionally, the value neutrality of additional in-
vestments can be complemented with specific conditions. For example, it can be assumed that
the additional expected operating profit ±[ ]
1
t 1OP ∗  reflects a constant return ( ROE ) on the
additional invested equity ±[ ]
1
tE IE :7
± ±[ ] [ ]
1 1
tt 1E OP ROE E IE∗ < √ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ .  (14)
The distribution of a constant proportion q  of the additional operating profit generates addi-
tional flow to equity:
± ±[ ] [ ]
1 1
t 1 t 1FTE q E OP∗ ∗< √ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ .  (15)
According to the retention of ±( ) [ ]
1
t 11 q E OP ∗, √  additional equity is invested. The change in
book value of the additional invested equity in period t 1∗  can be expressed as follows:
± ± ±[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ]
1 1 1
t 1 t t 1IE E IE 1 q E OP∗ ∗< ∗ , √ , ...for t T 1 T 2< ∗ ∗ ,  (16)
where 1 1T 1 T 1IE x∗ ∗<  holds. It can be shown that all relevant values denoted by  increase at
the same growth rate zw :
( )zw 1 q ROE< , √ . (17)
Finally, we assume that the additional investments have the same operating risk as the existing
investment program. With cost of equity ,s1ke
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As to equation (13), the additional retained earnings are value neutral if the following holds:
7 The argumentation is analog to the previous chapter. However, it refers to the return on equity and not to
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This result is in line with the explanations in the handbook of auditors (note 412), which refer
to Tschöpel et al. (2010).8 The ROE, which in our setting depicts the return on the invested
equity, is derived as the cost of equity before taxes in the handbook of auditors . It is shown that
the value of an initially available financial amount remains unchanged as long as the return of
additional investments complies with (21).9 Precisely this was shown in the above analysis for
the case that the available amount at the beginning of the observation period equals the addi-
tional retained earnings in period T 1∗ . Therefore, the example in the handbook of auditors
serves as a clarification of the above mentioned relationships from which it becomes obvious
that the same understanding underlies the handbook of auditors with regard to value neutrality.
So far, only the value effect of the additional retained earnings in period T 1∗  was subject of
investigation. In order to determine the effect on value in period T , we need to consider that
the change in distribution 1T 1x ∗  and the value increase in equity
,1
T 1E ∗
κ  have an effect on per-
sonal taxation of equity investors. If dividends are taxed at ds  and changes in market values at
gs , we obtain the following value effect in comparison to a residual dividend policy:
°
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(22) holds under the assumption that ,s1ke
κ  is suited for the assessment of the value effect.
8 See also Pawelzik (2010). When comparing the models by Tschöpel et al. (2010) and Pawelzik (2010), one
needs to consider that a full distribution in the former corresponds to a residual distribution in the latter, in
which retained earnings are made to finance the inflation-based growth. Differently from this work, a pos-
sible real growth is not considered in any of those studies.
9 Given value neutrality, the ROE corresponds to the cost of equity before taxes, as the additional invested
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Equation (23) shows that the additional retention of earnings leads to a value increase in previ-
ous periods, even if the respective additional investments are invested in value neutral projects.
This occurs whenever dividends are taxed differently than changes in market values, which is
a common assumption in corporate valuation practice. Only if the personal tax rates ds  and gs
are identical and additional retained earnings are invested in value neutral projects, value neu-
tral investments do not have a value effect in previous periods. Beyond the scope of (23), the
assumption of an active debt management induces additional financing effects. We will explic-
itly address this issue in the next section.
2.4 Terminal value calculation under an earnings-based dividend policy
In the following, we investigate how the terminal value calculation in (10) and (12) changes if
additional earnings are retained not only one-time but in every period of the steady state. We
assume that the flow to equity under an earnings-based dividend policy is determined as
e e
t tFTE q OP< √  , with the payout ratio q 1′ . The index e  denotes the earnings-based dividend
policy. Hence, at the valuation date, ± °[ ] [ ]
e e
t tE FTE q E OP< √  holds. The expected dividend is
composed of a deterministic and fixed proportion of the expected earnings. The latter holds also
under a residual dividend policy: based on the steady state assumptions, we also obtain
± °[ ] [ ]
r rr
t tE FTE q E OP< √  ,  with rq 1′ . However, this only depicts a relationship between ex-
pected values and does not imply that the firm distributes a fixed proportion of its actual earn-




tOP  only result from additional retained earnings.
If q  and rq  are different, an additional amount ∃[ ]tE x  is retained. It must be specified so that,
given all the effects of the earnings-based dividend policy, the payout ratio equals q . From the
steady state assumptions, the ratio of ∃[ ]tE x  and ±[ ]
r
tE FTE  is constant and known with certainty
at the valuation date. Thus, the additional retained earnings as well as ±[ ]
r
tE FTE  increase at the
growth rate w . Complemented with additional debt the additional retained earnings are used
to finance additional investments according to the pattern that was described in the previous
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section. Thus, it might be expected that the terminal value has to be computed as per the fol-
lowing valuation model:
↓
± ∃ ↓ ↓ ↓
, * , * , *
, *
,
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( [ ] [ ]) [ ]
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r e e e
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, ...for t T T 1< ∗ .  (24)
,skeκ  depicts the cost of equity suited to the earnings-based dividend policy with payout ratio
q . The tax saving in period t 1∗  appears at the numerator of (24), and results from the addi-
tional retained earnings. As ±[ ]
r
tE FTE  and ∃[ ]tE x  increase at the growth rate w , we obtain:
↓ ↓
, * , *
[ ] ( ) [ ]
e e
t 1 tE E 1 w E E∗ < ∗ √
κ κ , ...for t T T 1< ∗ .  (25)
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Equation (26) is commonly used in the literature (see for example Meitner 2008) and is also
prevalent in practice. The above derivation requires ± ∃ ±( [ ] [ ]) [ ]
r rz
t t tq E FtE E x E FtE< , . In this
respect, the existing literature sets z rq q q< . However, neither this nor (24) consider the value
effects deriving from switching from a residual to an earnings-based dividend policy. Such
effects, which were depicted in the last chapter, reduce the debt ratio, so that additional debt
must be issued in order to maintain the predetermined capital structure as indicated by the active
debt management. The additional debt issue leads to a higher potential distribution, additional
interests, and tax shields in the upcoming periods, resulting in a deviation of °[ ]
e




In the following, these complex effects of additional retained earnings are captured within a
recursive approach.
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 at the beginning of the steady state is:
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T 1E FtE ∗  increases at the growth rate w , and thus the same growth rate holds for the added
market value under an earnings-based dividend policy. Inserting
° °
, ,
[ ] ( ) [ ]
e e
T 1 TE 1 w E E∗ < ∗ √
κ κ










[ ] ( )
[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ( ) )
T 1e d g
T s
g d
E x s s
E
ke w 1 s L 1 s kd 1 w
∗ √ ,
<




∃[ ]tE x  is set in such a way that the deterministic payout ratio is q  at firm level. Note that,
compared to the residual dividend policy, the additional interests and tax shields resulting from
the additional debt lead to a reduction of the operating profit. Furthermore, the expected divi-
dend ±[ ]
e
tE Div  under an earnings-based dividend policy accounts for additional interests and
tax shields as well as additional distributions related to the change in debt as for the payout ratio
q , we obtain:
±
°
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Thus, the terminal value under an earnings-based dividend policy is the sum of two components
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Equation (31) indicates that an earnings-based dividend policy is accompanied by an added
market value even if the additional investments remain value neutral at the investment date.
Furthermore, it becomes clear, that the value increases only stem from different personal taxa-
tion of dividends and changes in market values. If dividends are taxed as changes in market
values, the terminal value is independent of the dividend policy. This corresponds to the result
by Miller and Modigliani (1961) about the irrelevance of the dividend policy.
The added market value to equity investors requires a corresponding debt issue, which follows
the predetermined capital structure of the active debt management. Given the overall value ef-
fect ± °
, ,
[ ] [ ] ( )
e e
TTE V E E 1 L< √ ∗
κ κ
, the terminal value under an earnings-based dividend policy
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Through equations (31) and (32), the terminal value at the beginning of the steady state can be
calculated within the flow to equity and the free cash flow approach. First, the (total) market
value that is associated with the free cash flow has to be determined. Afterwards, the flow to
equity ±[ ]
r
T 1E FtE ∗  as well as the operating profit °[ ]
r
T 1E OP ∗  will be known. This allows to
compute the added market value under an earnings-based dividend policy.
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2.5 Analysis of valuation errors
To determine the relevance of the above analysis, we compare equation (31) with the valuation
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As the terminal value models (31) and (33) do not differ with regard to the first part of the right
hand side in (33), we concentrate the analysis of valuation errors on the second part. Specifi-
cally, we derive the valuation error when (33) is used instead of (31). For this purpose, we
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The consequences of the financing effects, neglected in the valuation model used so far, are
depicted at the numerator of (34). More in detail, if the numerator is positive, the terminal value
is overestimated. An underestimation is also possible, but it requires an atypical high growth
rate w  compared to the cost of debt kd . Thus, the calculation of the terminal value in (26) is
usually accompanied by its overestimation. The percentage valuation error is, ceteris paribus,
larger, the smaller the payout ratio q , the corporate tax rate , the growth rate w , as well as
the higher the leverage L  and the cost of debt kd .10
In order to gain an indication of the expected average valuation errors, 2,000,000 valuation
cases were simulated, which differ by payout ratio q , cost of equity ,skeκ , cost of debt kd ,
leverage L, corporate tax rate , and growth rate w . We assume that all these variables are
independent of each other and uniformly distributed in the following intervals:
[ %; %]q 30 60⊆ , , [ %; %]ske 8 10⊆κ , [ %; %]kd 4 6⊆ , [ . ; ]L 0 4 2⊆  , [ %; %]25 35⊆ ,
[ . %; %]w 0 5 2⊆ .
The dividend tax rate ds  and the capital gains tax rate gs  are 26.375% and 13.188%, respec-
tively.11 Based on these assumptions, the simulation leads to the following probability distri-
bution of the valuation error (Figure 2).
10 These statements can be verified by computing the corresponding partial derivatives.
11 The tax rate on dividends corresponds to the so called “Abgeltungsteuersatz” plus the “Solidar-
itätszuschlag” in Germany. The tax rate on changes in market values is set equal to the half of the tax rate
on dividends.
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of the percentage valuation error.
Eventually, the application of the standard model (26) always brings to an overestimation of
the terminal value. The average percentage valuation error is 26.4%; the minimum and maxi-
mum valuation errors are, respectively, 2.1% and 81.3%; the standard deviation is 12.8%. The
sensitivity analysis shows that the error is explained for 69.6% by the leverage and 14.9% by
the cost of debt. Therefore, the application of the terminal value model (26) can lead to a seri-
ous overestimation of the added market value under an earnings-based dividend policy, espe-
cially if the firm has a high leverage and bad financial conditions. Even though the valuation
error is relatively small compared to the full terminal value - additional simulations show an
overestimation by an average of approximately 2% and a maximum overestimation by over
5% - it remains significant because of the high proportion of the terminal value to the market
value of the firm.
2.6 Conclusions
Theorists and practitioners of corporate valuation have been intensively debating on the appro-
priate way to calculate the terminal value of a firm. Some of the issues that must be dealt with
in this context relate to the firm dividend policy in the steady state. In the simplest case, a
residual dividend policy is adopted: the firm retains earnings according to inflation-based and
real growth as far as reflected in the growth rate. However, depending on the conditions in each
case, an earnings-based dividend policy might be better suited for valuation. A useful device is
the assumption that the retention of additional earnings remains value neutral at the time of the
investment. By examining how dividend and financing policy are consistently considered, this
study shows that the additional retained earnings increase the value in periods prior to the in-












financing, provided that the firm pursuits an active debt management. Consequently, additional
interests and tax shields arise, and firm earnings change.
The central result of this study is the development of a terminal value formula that considers
the discussed effects consistently. The proposed formula differs from that used in corporate
valuation practice in Germany. Conceptually, it becomes evident that the assumed financing
and dividend policy is not implemented consistently in the standard terminal value model. From
a practical perspective it is important that the terminal value is regularly overestimated. De-
pending on the parameters, the valuation error regarding the value contribution of an earnings-
based dividend policy is above 50% in extreme cases. Even compared to the full terminal value,
such error remains significant. Overall, the results of this study suggest rethinking the valuation
practice on the terminal value.
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3 Valuation with share repurchases and personal taxes12
Ralf Diedrich, Stefan Dierkes, and Johannes Sümpelmann
Abstract
We derive a consistent valuation approach integrating the interdependent effects of cash divi-
dends, share repurchases, and active debt management while considering personal taxes. Addi-
tionally, we identify effects of share repurchases on the cost of equity by deriving appropriate
adjustment formulae. Furthermore, we run simulations to investigate the valuation differences
caused by distribution of excess cash via cash dividends or share repurchases. The results show
that share repurchases have a significant positive effect on equity market value.
Keywords:  Valuation, share repurchases, cash dividends, active debt management, cost of
equity, equity market value, personal taxes
JEL Classification Codes: G32, H20, M41
12 Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314164.
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3.1 Introduction
Firms can use excess cash either for paying dividends or for share repurchases. The latter have
become increasingly important since the early 1980s and, nowadays, have nearly the same
magnitude as cash dividends (Brealey et al., 2017; Grullon & Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008).
The reasons for this are manifold: perceived stock undervaluation, signaling effects,
maintenance of financial flexibility, management of the “earnings per share” ratio, tax
considerations, etc. (e.g., Brav et al., 2005; Skinner, 2008). Among these reasons, tax
considerations are of particular importance to the firm’s choice about the distribution of excess
cash to shareholders (Bierman & West, 1966; Jacob & Jacob, 2013). Share repurchases lead to
stock price appreciation and thus to capital gains, which are taxed in a different way than cash
dividends. In the past, the tax rate on capital gains used to be lower than that on cash dividends
(e.g., Bierman & West, 1966, 1968; Elton & Gruber, 1968a, 1968b). Nowadays, many countries
such as the US and Germany tax cash dividends and capital gains equally. However, as shares
represent long-term investment, capital gains are typically not realized immediately. Therefore,
capital gains can be deferred, which leads to a tax advantage (Berk & De Marzo, 2017; Brealey
et al., 2017). Consequently, the effective tax rate on capital gains is lower than the tax rate on
dividends, so that distribution of excess cash via dividends or share repurchases becomes
relevant for the market value of equity.13
In this study, we examine the effects of cash dividends and share repurchases on the equity
market value of a firm. In line with common valuation frameworks, we derive a discounted
cash flow valuation model starting from a set of assumptions on the underlying financing
strategy. Since debt financing provides a corporate tax advantage, the choice of a firm’s
financing strategy (i.e., passive or active debt management) has an effect on the value of tax
shields and thus on the equity market value (Modigliani & Miller [MM], 1958, 1963; Miles &
Ezzell [ME], 1980, 1985; Harris & Pringle [HP], 1985).14 Passive debt management is
characterized by predetermined debt levels, whereas active debt management presumes
predetermined targets for the capital structure. In this analysis, we assume active debt
management as ME and HP. While ME adjust the capital structure only at the beginning of a
period, HP allow for a continuous adjustment. The respective assumptions influence the tax
shields’ discount rate and, thereby, the equity market value. Linking these assumptions to the
taxation consequences of the choice on excess cash use (i.e., cash dividends or share
repurchases) leads to a valuation model that has not been investigated in the literature so far.
The tax advantage of share repurchases over cash dividends has been first addressed by Elton
and Gruber (1968a), Bierman and West (1966), Brigham (1966), and Robicheck and Myers
13 The optimal dividend policy would imply that a firm pays no cash dividends at all. However, cash divi-
dends are still made for signaling purposes and several other reasons (Black, 1976).
14 Note that MM (1958, 1963), ME (1980, 1985) as well as HP (1985) abstract from personal taxes.
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(1965). Bierman and West (1966) assume – as we do – that a predetermined cash dividend ratio
is used for the distribution of excess cash among dividends and share repurchases. Differently
from our analysis, the authors do not make any assumption on the financing strategy and do not
specify the underlying cost of equity. Consequently, they do not account for additional
financing effects resulting from active debt management nor derive an adjustment formula for
the cost of equity. Rashid and Amoako-Adu (1987), (1995) address the effect of share
repurchases on the equity market value in a common valuation framework. They assume that
excess cash is distributed to equity investors according to a predetermined dividend payout ratio
based on earnings. The retained cash is used for share repurchases to ensure that investment
and financing decisions remain independent. In more detail, in the first study, the authors
develop the relevant valuation calculus for the adjusted present value approach while assuming
a steady state with inflation-based growth and passive debt management. They then extend the
study to derive an adjustment formula for the cost of equity, which also allows the application
of the flow to equity approach. As these studies assume passive debt management, they are only
partially comparable with ours.
Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, we derive the valuation model for
a firm that simultaneously distributes cash dividends and repurchases shares while pursuing
active debt management. The value effect associated with share repurchases affects the capital
structure, which concerns different parts of the valuation model. To the best of our knowledge,
these effects have not been detected or examined in the literature. Second, in line with ME and
HP, effects of the tax advantage of share repurchases on the cost of equity are disclosed by
deriving appropriate adjustment formulae. Both the explicit forecast period and steady state
phase are analyzed. The resulting formulae have the same structure as common adjustment
formulae do. Third, we compute the valuation difference resulting from a valuation assuming
cash dividends only as compared with a valuation considering cash dividends and share
repurchases. Under otherwise identical assumptions, the equity market value is always lower if
only cash dividends are paid. The average valuation difference amounts to 5.2% in the ME and
to 9% in the HP case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic valuation
model for the unlevered firm that distributes excess cash via cash dividends and share
repurchases. In Section 3, we develop the valuation model for the levered firm and highlight
the interdependent effects of cash dividends, share repurchases, and active debt management
on the equity market value. In Section 4, we derive adjustment formulae for the cost of equity
of the levered firm under the ME and HP settings. Finally, we present the simulation results on
the valuation differences under different cash distribution strategies (Section 5). The paper
concludes by summarizing the most important results.
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3.2 Valuation model for the unlevered firm
In this section, we assume that the firm is all-equity financed. The firm’s expected free cash
flows ±[ ]tE FCF  in periods t = 1,2,...  are given, and the unlevered cost of equity after personal
taxes uke  is constant over time. Cash dividends and effective capital gains are taxed differently
with tax rates d  and g . Tax rates do not vary across investors and time. Capital gains
correspond to changes in market values at the end of each period (Clubb & Doran, 1992). The
firm distributes its excess cash via cash dividends and share repurchases. As the latter lead to
stock price appreciation, share repurchases are subject to effective capital gains tax rate g
(Rashid & Amoako-Adu, 1995). Regarding the magnitudes of the cash dividend tax rate and
effective capital gains tax rate, we expect d g= . Finally, we assume that the forecasting
period is divided into an explicit forecast period and a steady state phase. In other words, the
valuation object reaches a steady state at the end of the explicit forecast period, in which the
free cash flow and expected values of all other relevant variables (e.g., earnings before interest
and taxes and capital expenditures) increase at a uniform and constant growth rate g . This
nominal growth rate can include both inflation-based and real growth (Penman, 2013; Koller et
al., 2015).
In more detail, in period t , the firm distributes cash dividend ratio t0 r 1′ ′  of the available
free cash flow as cash dividend and uses the residual cash flow for share repurchases. We
assume cash dividend ratio tr  to be a predetermined corporate policy variable (Bierman & West,
1966; Rashid & Amoako-Adu, 1995). Thus, the shareholders’ total surplus after personal taxes
can be determined as follows:15
± ±[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )√ √ , ∗ , √ √ ,t tt d t gr E FCF 1 1 r E FCF 1 ,...,for  t 1 T< , (35)
where T  denotes the end of the explicit forecast period. By definition, the expected equity
market value of the unlevered firm [ ]ut 1E E ,∃  at time t 1,  corresponds to the total surplus after
personal taxes; change in market value ( [ ] [ ])u ut t 1E E E E ,,∃ ∃ , which is taxed by g ; and equity
market value [ ]utE E∃  at time t  discounted by the cost of equity
uke  after personal taxes.
15 All uncertain variables are denoted by a tilde.
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Hence, a recursive approach leads us to the following:
± ±[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( [ ] [ ]) [ ]
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,...,for  t 1 T< . (36)
The taxation of changes in market values lead to a circularity problem, because the equity
market value at time ,t 1  affects the tax base of personal taxes on capital gains in period t .
This circularity problem can be easily overcome by solving equation (36) for the equity market
value at time t 1, :
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where ( ) ( )d g gd) < , ,  indicates a modified personal tax rate, and ( )
)
< ,u u gke ke 1
denotes the modified cost of equity of the unlevered firm. d)  can be interpreted as a dividend
tax penalty for equity investors or the personal tax disadvantage of cash dividends over capital
gains (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017; Dhaliwal et al., 2005; Dempsey, 2001; Naranjo et al., 1998;
Poterba & Summers, 1985). To identify the value effect associated with the tax shield of share
repurchases, we rearrange the terms in equation (37) to obtain the following:
± ±, ,[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ]
[ ]
market value without tax shields added market value of tax shields
from share repurchases from share repurchases
u c u
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∃ ∃
,...,for  t 1 T< . (38)
In equation (38), the first term depicts the expected market value without tax shields from share
repurchases ,[ ],
u c
t 1E E∃ , whereas the second term denotes the added market value of tax shields
from share repurchases ,[ ],
u
t 1E E∃ . Here, the tax advantage of share repurchases over cash
dividends becomes apparent. The superscripts c  resp.  denote the corresponding variables.16
In the steady state, all relevant values increase at the nominal growth rate g .
16 If the variable has no superscript c  or , it refers to the overall values.
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Thus, we obtain the expected terminal value of valuation object [ ]uTE E∃  in period T  as follows:
± ±
, ,
( ) [ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( ) ( )
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In equation (39), the taxation of effective capital gains is considered by the reduced growth rate
( )√ , gg 1 . Equations (38) and (39) indicate that the firm’s market value decreases as cash
dividend ratios ( tr  and r , respectively) increase, which is due to the different taxation of cash
dividends and capital gains.17 Furthermore, equations (38) and (39) show that the added market
value of tax shields from share repurchases stems only from the difference in the corresponding
tax rates. If <d g  holds, the added market value of tax shields from share repurchases
becomes zero, and the two equations translate into a valuation calculus without personal taxes,
which corresponds to the MM’s (1961) result of dividend irrelevancy. 18
Overall, the effect of the added market value of tax shields from share repurchases on the market
value of an unlevered firm emerges as uncritical. However, if we consider a levered firm with
predetermined capital structure targets, the value enhancing effect generates additional
financing effects. The next section addresses this issue.
3.3 Valuation model for the levered firm
We now assume that the firm is financed with both equity and debt. With respect to the previous
setting, we add the following assumptions: As creditors do not bear any risk, the cost of debt
kd  corresponds to the risk-free interest rate and is constant over time. Furthermore, the debt
book value equals the debt market value. Interest on debt is fully deductible from taxable firm
income (as in MM, 1963 and ME, 1980, among many others), and corporate tax rate  is
independent of the amount of this income.19 Concerning debt investors’ personal taxation, we
introduce tax rate b  for interest income. Thus, we consider three different personal tax rates
for cash dividends, interest income, and capital gains.20
17 This statement can be verified by computing the corresponding partial derivatives in equations (38) and
(39).
18 If the cash dividend tax rate equals the effective capital gains tax rate, the cost of equity without personal
taxes is obtained by dividing the cost of equity with personal taxes uke  through one minus the uniform
tax rate.
19 If interest on debt is only partially deductible, the appropriate tax rate of this tax base is used.
20 In many European countries, the tax rate for cash dividends and interests is the same and thus <d b .
Hence, the model derivations can be easily translated into different tax systems.
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As for the financing strategy of the valuation object, we assume an active debt management
characterized by predetermined leverage tL  in period t . Leverage is defined as follows:
, ,
, ,
[ ] [ ]





related to market value related to added market value of
without tax shields from tax shields from share repurc
share repurchases
c
t t t t
t c
t t
L E E L E EL
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,...,for  t 0 T 1< , , (40)
where ,ctE
κ∃  is the market value of equity without tax shields from share repurchases, and ,tE
κ∃
is the additional market value of equity related to tax shields from share repurchases. From
equation (40), it is evident that in case of active debt management, additional debt ,t tL E√
κ∃
must be issued to adhere to the predetermined leverage. If the firm only issued debt related to
the equity market value without tax shields from share repurchases, the leverage would be lower
than the predetermined one. Note that issuing additional debt implies additional interest and tax
shields, which, in turn, affect different parts of the flow to equity valuation calculus. In the end,
the total amount of debt issued becomes ct t tD D D< ∗∃ ∃ ∃ , while the market value of equity is
, ,c
t t tE E E< ∗
κ κ κ∃ ∃ ∃ .
By considering only debt that relates to the equity market value without tax shields from share
repurchases, the expected ±
c
tFtE  is computed as follows:
± ±[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
c c c c c
t t t 1 t 1 t t 1E FtE E FCF kd E D kd E D E D E D, , ,< , √ ∗ √ √ ∗ ,∃ ∃ ∃ ∃
,...,for  t 1 T< , (41)
where [ ]ct 1kd E D ,√ ∃  is the expected interest paid relatively to the equity market value without
tax shields from share repurchases in period t . The term [ ]ct 1kd E D ,√ √ ∃  depicts the tax shield
resulting from the tax deductibility of interests. The change of debt in period t  is
[ ] [ ]c ct t 1E D E D ,,∃ ∃ . As the amount of debt depends on the equity market value at time t
,( [ ] [ ])c ct t tE D L E E< √
κ∃ ∃ , it is unknown at the time of valuation (active debt management).
Once additional debt is issued to adhere to the predetermined leverage, the expected flow to
equity ±[ ]tE FtE  is obtained as follows:
± ± ±
±
[ ] [ ] [ ]




t t 1 t 1 t t 1
E FtE E FtE E FtE
E FtE kd E D kd E D E D E D, , ,
< ∗
< , √ ∗ √ √ ∗ ,∃ ∃ ∃ ∃
,...,for  t 1 T< . (42)
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It includes the flow to equity related to the market value without tax shields from share
repurchases ±
c
tFtE  as well as ± tFtE , the additional flow to equity due to the additional debt
,√ <t t tL E D
κ∃ ∃ . Equation (42) shows that ± tFtE  comprises both additional interests paid and
additional tax shields received. Besides, ± tFtE  also considers the change in additional debt.
Given the cash dividend ratio tr , we assume that the proportion ±√ ttr FtE  is used for cash
dividends and ±( ), √ tt1 r FtE  is used for share repurchases. Accordingly, the shareholders’ total
surplus of the levered firm can be determined as follows:21
± ± ± ±( [ ] [ ]) ( ) ( ) ( [ ] [ ]) ( )√ ∗ √ , ∗ , √ ∗ √ ,
c
t t t tt d t gr E FtE E FtE 1 1 r E FtE E FtE 1
,...,for  t 1 T< . (43)
Thus, the valuation calculus for the levered firm is as follows:
± ± ± ±
,
( [ ] [ ]) ( ) ( ) ( [ ] [ ]) ( )
[ ]
( [ ] [ ]) [
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1 ke
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∗

















,...,for  t 1 T< . (44)
The total surplus, change in equity market value, and equity market value in period t  in equation
(44) are discounted at the risk-adjusted cost of equity ,rtke
κ .
21 We assume that the cash dividend ratios tr  and r  are identical for the unlevered and the levered firm.
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,...,for  t 1 T< , (45)
with , , ( )
)
< ,r rt t gke ke 1
κ κ . In equation (45), ,,t 1E
κ∃  is the sum of the added market value of tax
shields from share repurchases and the market value of additional debt effects. The relevant
cost of equity is the modified cost of equity.
In the steady state, all relevant values increase at growth rate g . Thus, the expected terminal
value of the valuation object [ ]TE E
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Both the leverage and cost of equity are constant here.
Equations (45) and (46) resemble equations (38) resp. (39), but they exhibit increased
complexity due to debt effects. In more detail, we face further circularity problems as ±
c
tFtE
and ± tFtE  are affected by tax shields, interests, and debt changes according to equations (41)




,[ ],t 1E E
κ∃ .
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A. Equity Market Value Without Tax Shields from Share Repurchases
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Solving equation (47) for ,[ ]ct 1E E ,
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The term ( ) ( )dkd 1 L 1√ , √ √ ,  in the denominator of equation (49) embodies interests paid
and tax shields received that are adapted to a situation without share repurchases. ( )√ √ , dg L 1
considers the expected increase in debt according to growth rate g .
B. Additional Market Value from Share Repurchases
To determine the additional market value ,[ ],t 1E E
κ∃ , we substitute the additional debt effects on
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Solving equation (50) for ,[ ]t 1E E ,
κ∃  with ,[ ] [ ]t t tE D L E E< √
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Note that after computing the equity market value according to equations (48) and (49), ±
c
FtE
can be determined and the application of equations (51) and (52) is not affected by circularity
problems. However, the valuation calculus for the levered firm cannot be applied as long as the
cost of equity, ,rtke
κ  resp. ,rkeκ , is not known. We will address this issue in the next section.
3.4 The cost of equity
In this section, we derive adjustment formulae for the cost of equity by following ME (1980),
(1985) and HP (1985). ME and HP differ in their assumptions on the temporal adjustment of
debt to the predetermined leverage: ME assume that adjustment can only occur at the beginning
of a period, whereas HP allow for continuous adjustment. ME conclude that the tax shield is
certain in the period of its emergence and thus discounts at the risk-free interest rate within this
period. For all previous periods, however, the relevant discount rate is the cost of equity of the
unlevered firm. According to HP, the unlevered cost of equity is the relevant discount rate for
all periods.
To investigate the relationship between the costs of equity of the unlevered and levered firms,
we rearrange the terms in equations (37) and (44). After rearranging the terms in equation (37),
we obtain
±[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]u u ut t t 1 tdE FCF 1 r E E 1 ke E E
)
) ,√ , √ < √ ∗ ,∃ ∃ ,...,for  t 1 T< . (53)
Furthermore, from (44), we have
±
,

















∃ , ...,for  t 1 T< , (54)
where ± ±t t t 1 t 1 t t 1FtE FCF kd D kd D D D, , ,< , √ ∗ √ √ ∗ ,∃ ∃ ∃ ∃  holds with
c
t t tD D D< ∗∃ ∃ ∃ . Equation
(54) cannot be used for valuation without further information on the effects that have been
discussed in the last section. Yet, it is adequate to derive an adjustment formula for the cost of
equity.
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In addition to equations (53) and (54), we need the expected market value of tax shields in the
ME setting, ±[ ]
ME
t 1E VTS ,  (for more details see Appendix 1):
±
± ±
[ ] ( ( ) ) [ ] ( ( ) )
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( ) ( )
[ ] [ ]( ) ( )
( )
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, ...,for  t 1 T< . (55)
The expected market value of tax shields comprises three parts. The first part
[ ] ( ( ) ),√ √ √ , √ , , √t 1 t d t gkd E D 1 r 1 r∃  stems from the deductibility of interests from firm
income, adapted to the case with personal taxes and share repurchases. This part of the tax
shield is also calculated from valuation models without considering personal taxes. The other
two parts relate to the different taxation of equity and debt investors. The second part,
[ ] ( ( ) ),√ √ , √ , , √t 1 b t d t gkd E D 1 r∃ , results from the different taxation of interests. While the
tax rates of equity investors in this term are affected by the cash dividend ratio tr , the tax rate
of debt investors is not. The third part, ( ) ( [ ] [ ]),, √ √ ,d g t t t 1r E D E D∃ ∃ , relates to the different
taxation of changes in debt, because debt issuance and redemption are not subject to the taxation
of debt investors (Dempsey, 2017). The change in debt, however, is tax-relevant in this context
as debt issuance or redemption substitutes the retention resp. distribution of earnings. Note that
the second and third part disappear if d g b< < .
Each part in equation (55) with regard to period t 1,  is discounted at the risk-free interest rate
after personal taxes ( )bkd 1√ , . For all parts with regard to period t ,
uke  is the appropriate
risk-adjusted discount rate, because the market values of the levered and the unlevered firm
differ only by a deterministic factor, which is known for each period. Hence, the same discount
rate is used as that for the market value of the unlevered firm (ME, 1980, 1985). In order to
derive the adjustment formula for the cost of equity of the levered firm, equations (54) and (55)
are brought together with equation (53) and the following common relationship from value
additivity:
±[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
MEu
tt t tE E E E E D E VTS< ∗ ,
κ∃ ∃ ∃ , ...,for  t 0 T 1< , . (56)
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After rearranging, we obtain the adjustment formula for the cost of equity given the ME
assumptions (see Appendix 2):
, , ( ( )) ( ( ) )( ( ))
( )
t d t gr ME u u
t b t 1
g b
1 kd 1 1 r 1 r
ke ke ke kd 1 L
kd 1 ,
∗ √ , √ , √ , , √
< ∗ , √ , √ √
, ∗ √ ,
κ
, ...,for  t 1 T< . (57)
In the steady state, the leverage and the cash dividend ratio r  are constant so that we have:
, , ( ( )) ( ( ) )( ( ))
( )
d gr ME u u
b
g b
1 kd 1 1 r 1 r
ke ke ke kd 1 L
kd 1
∗ √ , √ , √ , , √
< ∗ , √ , √ √
, ∗ √ ,
κ  . (58)
The adjustment formulae in equations (57) and (58) resemble those developed by MM and ME.
Starting from the cost of equity uke , which depicts the operating risk of the valuation object, a
risk premium is added to incorporate financial risk. The risk premium is affected by the
dividend tax penalty, which reflects the tax advantage of share repurchases as compared to cash




, ,r MEkeκ  because the tax rate on cash dividends is higher than the tax rate on effective capital
gains.22 Thus, the tax advantage of share repurchases comes along with increasing financial
risk. As equations (57) and (58) only refer to parameters that are known at the valuation date,
the adjustment formulae apply without circularity problems.
Differently from ME, HP assumes that debt can be continuously adjusted to the predetermined
leverage. This leads to the following equation for the expected market value of tax shields,
±[ ]
HP
t 1E VTS , :
±
± ±
[ ] ( ( ) ) [ ] ( ( ) )
[ ]
[ ] [ ] ( )[ ] [ ]( )
HP t 1 t d t g t 1 b t d t g
t 1 u u
HP HP
t 1 tg gt t 1
d g t u u u
kd E D 1 r 1 r kd E D 1 r
E VTS
1 ke 1 ke
E VTS E VTS 1E D E Dr




√ √ √ , √ , , √ √ √ , √ , , √
< ,
∗ ∗
∑ ⌡ √ √ ,,
, , √ √ ∗ ∗  ∗ ∗ ∗ 
∃ ∃
∃ ∃
, ...,for  t 1 T< . (59)
As compared to equation (55), the relevant discount rate for all parts of the tax shield is the cost
of equity of the unlevered firm, uke .
22 This statement can be verified by computing the corresponding partial derivatives in equations (57) and
(58).
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Accordingly, the HP-type adjustment formula can be derived as follows (for more details see
Appendix 3):
, ( ( ))HP u ut b t 1ke ke ke kd 1 L ,< ∗ , √ , √
κ
, ...,for  t 1 T< . (60)
If leverage is constant, we obtain
, ( ( ))HP u u bke ke ke kd 1 L< ∗ , √ , √
κ . (61)
As in the ME case, the adjustment formulae in (60) and (61) are not subject to circularity
problems. Apparently, the tax advantage of share repurchases has no effect on the cost of equity
following the assumptions by HP. This indicates a major advantage as (61) is independent of
the cash dividend ratio r . Consequently, it is not necessary to specify this ratio for the levering
and unlevering of beta factors.
By deriving the above adjustment formulae, we provide consistent valuation models for the
case of a firm that simultaneously pays dividends and repurchases shares. The common
adjustment formulae in the ME and HP case without personal taxes are obtained if d g b< <
is assumed.
3.5 Simulation of valuation differences
In this section, we examine how the valuation results vary depending on the distribution
strategy. For this we compare the cash dividends only strategy with r 1<  and the cash
dividends and share repurchases strategy with r 1; , and we determine the valuation
differences via simulations. For simplicity, we assume that the valuation object has reached a
steady state. For r 1<  the expected equity market value ,<
ME
r 1E
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As the HP-type adjustment formula (equation (61)) is independent of the cash dividend ratio r
it is also applicable if the excess cash is only partially distributed as cash dividends.













The expected equity market value ,MEEκ  is the sum of the market value without tax shields
from share repurchases ,cEκ  (equation (49)) and the added market value ,Eκ  according to
equation (52). The cost of equity is specified by the adjustment formula (58). To illustrate the
average percentage valuation error, we simulated 1,000,000 valuation cases, which differed
with regard to the cash dividend ratio r , corporate tax rate , cost of debt kd , growth rate g ,
leverage L , and cost of equity uke . We assumed that all valuation parameters are independent
of each other and uniformly distributed over the following intervals: 24
[ %; %] [ %; %] [ %; %]
[ . %; . %], [ %; %], [ %; %]u
r 10 60 , 25 35 , kd 2 4 ,




The cash dividend tax rate and the effective capital gains tax rate are assumed to be 25% and
12.5%, respectively. The interest tax rate is also 25%.
Based on these assumptions, the conducted simulation leads to the frequency distribution of the
percentage valuation error in the ME case depicted in Figure 3.
24 Note that the free cash flow is independent of debt effects and hence cancels out with the percentage value
difference MEp  in equation (65) and HPp  in equation (67).
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Figure 3: Frequency distribution of the valuation error in the ME setting.
Determining the equity market value using the valuation formula (62) with the cost of equity
according to (63), instead of the valuation formulae (49) and (52) with the cost of equity
according to (58), always produces an underestimation of the equity market value. The average
valuation error is approximately -5.2%, with maximum and minimum valuation errors of
10.1%,  and -2.4%, respectively, and a standard deviation of 1.5%. A sensitivity analysis
shows that 54% resp. 45.8% of the valuation error can be explained by the cash dividend ratio
and the leverage. The lower the leverage and the cash dividend ratio, the higher the valuation
error. Overall, if the firm distributes its excess cash mainly via share repurchases and has a low
leverage, the percentage valuation error becomes severe.













As above, ,HPEκ  denotes the equity market value in the HP case and is calculated as sum of the
market value without tax shields from share repurchases ,cEκ  (equation (49)) and the added
market value ,Eκ  according to (52). The cost of capital is computed using the cost of equity
according to (61). For all valuation parameters, the same distributions apply as in the ME case.












Figure 4: Frequency distribution of the valuation error in the HP setting.
As in the ME case, the application of valuation formula (64) always produces an
underestimation of the equity market value. The average valuation error is approximately -9%,
with maximum and minimum valuation errors of -13.2% and -4.6%, respectively, and a
standard deviation of 1.9%. A sensitivity analysis shows that 96% of the valuation error is
explained by the cash dividend ratio, and that the valuation error increases as the cash dividend
ratio decreases. In the HP case, the level of leverage has a negligible small effect on the
valuation error. This is mainly because the cost of equity in the HP case (equation (61)) is
independent of the cash dividend ratio r  and hence independent of the distribution strategy.
The valuation error is severe for those firms distributing their excess cash mainly via share
repurchases. The valuation error tends to be even higher than in the ME case as the cost of
equity does not increase with share repurchases.
From the two simulations above, it becomes evident that the distribution strategy as the level
of the cash dividend ratio r  has a big impact on the valuation errors in the ME and HP case. To
obtain the average valuation underestimations under specific distribution strategies, we run six
additional simulations, in which we assume different deterministic cash dividend ratios from
10% to 60%. The other valuation parameters underlie the same distributions as in (66). The six













Figure 5: Average valuation underestimation in dependence of different cash dividend ratios r .
For example, if the cash dividend ratio is set to 10% the average equity market value
underestimation is over 12% in the HP case and approximately 7% in the ME case if the applied
valuation model does not account for share repurchases under otherwise identical assumptions.
These additional simulation results emphasize the relevance of our valuation model, especially
in cases of low cash dividend ratios.
3.6 Conclusions
Share repurchases have become an important alternative to distribute excess cash to
shareholders, not least due to the personal tax advantage they provide in comparison to cash
dividends. If both cash dividends and share repurchases are used, the equity market value
increases with increasing share repurchases. Under an active debt management, this leads to the
issuance of additional debt in order to adhere to the predetermined capital structure.
Consequently, additional interests and tax shields arise, which in turn affect the flow to equity
and thereby the equity market value.
The central result of this paper is a valuation model with three different personal tax rates for
dividends, capital gains, and interests that account for the interdependencies between cash
dividends, share repurchases, and active debt management. In this valuation model, the equity
market value is determined as the sum of the equity market value without tax shields from share
repurchases and the added market value due to tax shields from share repurchases and additional
debt effects. Furthermore, we revealed the effects of share repurchases on the cost of equity by
deriving the necessary adjustment formulae in the ME and HP case. Those adjustment formulae
are indeed similar to the known adjustment formulae without personal taxes, but allow
considering personal taxes in both cases. In the ME case, the adjustment formula is dependent
on the cash dividend ratio and hence accounts for the tax advantage of share repurchases.
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Evidently, the financial risk increases not only for higher leverages, but also for lower cash
dividend ratios, which leads to higher costs of equity. In contrast, the cost of equity is
independent of the cash dividend ratio in the HP case.
Our valuation model accounts for an explicit forecast period and a steady state phase and can
be applied in valuation practice without circularity problems in the ME as well as in the HP
case. This opens the possibility for a differentiated valuation approach concerning the
distribution of excess cash. This seems to be even more desirable as our simulations show that
the value contribution of share repurchases is far from negligible in both cases. For
practitioners, the valuation model in the HP case might be more attractive because the
adjustment formula is formally simple and independent of the cash dividend ratio. Especially,
the independence of the cash dividend ratio can be beneficial for the unlevering and relevering
of beta factors. However, practitioners should be aware of the effect that the equity market value
increases severely with decreasing cash dividend ratios. Finally, further theoretical research
could focus on different assumptions regarding the firm’s financing strategy (e.g., passive debt
management) and its dividend strategy (e.g., an earnings-based dividend strategy) in
consideration of personal taxes.
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4 Valuation, personal taxes, and dividend policy
under passive debt management25
Stefan Dierkes and Johannes Sümpelmann
Abstract
We derive consistent valuation models in accordance with the flow to equity and adjusted pre-
sent value approaches, which allow accounting for the firm’s dividend policy and passive debt
management in light of differentiated personal taxes at the equity investor level. Specifically,
we establish appropriate adjustment formulas for the relationship between the firm’s unlevered
and levered cost of equity, which are the basis for the unlevering and relevering of beta factors.
Furthermore, using simulations, we show that dividend policy has a significantly positive effect
on equity market value.
Keywords: valuation, personal taxes, passive debt management, dividend policy, cost of eq-
uity
JEL Classification: G32, H20, M41
25 Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3314012.
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4.1 Introduction
Since debt financing provides a corporate tax advantage, the choice of a firm’s financing policy
between passive or active debt management, affects the value of tax shields and, thus, firm
value (Miles & Ezzell, 1980, 1985; Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963).26 Thereby, passive debt
management is characterized by predetermined debt levels, whereas active debt management
presumes predetermined capital structure targets in future periods. In this study, we assume
passive debt management, as in Modigliani and Miller (1963). Besides financing policy, divi-
dend policy, as the choice for distributing or retaining cash flows, also affects equity market
value. This is because distributed cash flows are taxed at the cash dividend tax rate, which
differs from the effective capital gains tax rate at which retained cash flows are taxed. In the
past, the tax rate on realized capital gains used to be indeed lower than that on cash dividends.
Nowadays, in the USA and numerous other countries, such as Germany, tax systems that
equally tax cash dividends and realized capital gains exist. However, because investments in
shares are usually long term, the corresponding capital gains are normally not realized imme-
diately. Hence, capital gains taxes can be deferred, resulting in a tax advantage compared to the
cash dividend taxes (Berk & DeMarzo, 2017; Brealey et al., 2017).27 Overall, the relevance of
the dividend policy considering differentiated personal tax rates at the equity investor level and
the assumption of passive debt management in this paper lead to a valuation model that has not
yet been developed in the literature.
A starting point for integrating personal taxes in valuation models are the studies of Farrar and
Selwyn (1967) and Myers (1967). The literature most closely related to dividend policy in con-
sideration of differentiated personal tax rates at the equity investor level starts with the study of
Amoako-Adu (1983). The author assumes – as we do – that the cash flow available for distri-
bution is distributed to equity investors by a predetermined payout ratio, while the remaining
cash flow is retained by the firm. He derives a valuation model according to the adjusted present
value (APV) approach, assuming passive debt management and a steady state, wherein new
investments equivalent to the depreciations are undertaken. Subsequently, Rashid and Amoako-
Adu (1987) only extend the existing APV approach of Amoako-Adu (1983) by an inflation-
based growth of all relevant values, accordingly not recognizing additional real growth. More-
over, Rashid and Amoako-Adu (1995) derive an adjustment formula for the cost of equity,
which is consistent with the derived market value of tax shields in their 1987 study. Conse-
quently, it is also possible to apply the flow to equity (FtE) approach. However, we show that
the valuation models of Rashid and Amoako-Adu (1987, 1995) contain inconsistencies regard-
ing the effective capital gains tax rate, resulting from the assumption of a steady state with an
26 Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1980, 1985) abstract from personal taxes.
27 The optimal dividend policy would imply that a firm pays no cash dividends at all. However, cash divi-
dends are created because of signaling effects and other reasons (Arditti, Levy & Sarnat, 1976; Black,
1976).
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inflation-based growth of all relevant values. Note that an explicit forecast period is neither
accounted for by Amoako-Adu (1983) nor Rashid and Amoako-Adu (1987, 1995).
More recent studies with respect to the integration of personal taxes in valuation models deal
with, for example, the tax loss treatment in case of debt default (Cooper & Nyborg, 2008; Mol-
nár & Nyborg, 2013). A recent study published by Dempsey (2017) develops different dis-
counting techniques for the various DCF models, while integrating personal taxes. Specifically,
he derives weighted average cost of capital and cost of equity under both passive and active
debt management according to the debt adjustment assumptions of Harris and Pringle (1985).
Moreover, he shows that the different DCF models yield the same equity market value, given
an explicit forecast period. Concerning the personal taxation of equity investors, each of the
above-mentioned recent studies assumes a blended personal tax rate on cash dividends and
capital gains (Sick, 1990; Taggart, 1991). In particular, Dempsey (2017, pp. 3-4) writes: “For
simplicity of exposition, Eq  is defined here as a single value for a particular firm that encapsu-
lates the mix of how the firm chooses between retentions to equity, dividends and stock repur-
chases.” Hence, the assumption of a blended personal tax rate serves as a simplification as it
keeps the valuation models tractable. However, commonly, it remains an open question how
such a blended personal tax rate is determined and, consequently, this indeterminacy results in
difficulties when applying the valuation models.
The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. First, we develop the valuation model
of a firm under passive debt management, which distributes part of its cash flow as cash divi-
dends and retains the other part. The retained cash flow is assumed to be used for share repur-
chases (Rashid & Amoako-Adu, 1987, 1995). The consideration of two different equity investor
tax rates on cash dividends and effective capital gains leads to the derivation of a blended per-
sonal tax rate, which is dependent on the dividend policy of the firm. In the literature, it gener-
ally remains unclear how the dividend policy affects this tax rate (e.g., Dempsey, 2017). Sec-
ond, the effects of the dividend policy on the cost of equity are disclosed by deriving appropriate
adjustment formulas. Both the explicit forecast period and steady state phase are analyzed. Spe-
cifically, our derived adjustment formula for the steady state differs from that of Rashid and
Amoako-Adu (1995), who do not account for the effective capital gains tax rate consistently.
Conceptually, the FtE and APV approaches developed by Dempsey (2017) can be converted
and specified into the FtE and APV approaches derived in this study under the assumptions of
passive debt management and uniform blended personal tax rates. In this regard, the derivation
of the blended personal tax rate has implications for the underlying cost of equity. To the best
of our knowledge, the interdependent effects between the blended personal tax rate in this paper
and the underlying cost of equity have not been detected in the existing literature. Finally, the
relevance of our derived valuation model is demonstrated for each case by using numerical
examples and simulations compared to a valuation model, which assumes the full distribution
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of the FtE to equity investors. Specifically, the simulation results show that the average valua-
tion underestimation is 7.6% if the FtE is fully distributed to equity investors under otherwise
identical assumptions. Overall, the main results of this paper are consistent valuation models
that allow accounting for a firm’s dividend policy and passive debt management in light of
differentiated personal taxes at the equity investor level.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the valuation model of the
unlevered firm is presented. Then, the valuation model of the levered firm is developed accord-
ing to the FtE approach under passive debt management in Section 3. Subsequently, we derive
the market value of tax shields and adjustment formulas for the cost of equity of the levered
firm in Section 4. In Section 5, we present numerical examples and simulation results for the
valuation differences under different dividend policies. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Valuation model for the unlevered firm
In the following, we divide the forecast horizon into an explicit forecast period and a subsequent
steady state. In the steady state, all relevant variables increase at a nominal growth rate g ,
which considers an inflation-based growth and/or real growth (Friedl & Schwetzler, 2011; Pen-
man, 2013). We expect that the firm is all-equity financed. The expected free cash flow,
±[ ]tE FCF , in period , ,...t 1 2<  is given. Generally, the firm will not distribute the full free cash
flow as cash dividends to equity investors, but only a certain percentage of it. This might be
due to several reasons, such as exploiting the tax advantage of retained over distributed cash
flows. Therefore, firm’s management sets a deterministic payout ratio, tr 1′ , in period t , which
is related to the free cash flow. Consequently, the expected cash dividend, ±[ ]
u
tE Div , of the
unlevered firm is calculated as:28
± ±[ ] [ ]
u
t ttE Div r E FCF< √ , ,...,for t 1 T< , (68)
where T  depicts the end of the explicit forecast period. In the presence of personal taxes, dis-
tributed and retained cash flows have different tax implications. The proportion of the free cash
flow, tr , which is distributed to equity investors, is taxed at the cash dividend tax rate, d . The
residual ( )t1 r,  of the free cash flow is retained by the firm. We follow Rashid and Amoako-
Adu (1987, 1995) in assuming that the retained free cash flows are used for share repurchases
to maintain the independence of investment and financing decisions. Hence, the retained free
cash flows lead to stock price appreciation and are thus taxed at the effective capital gains tax
rate, g . The cash dividend and effective capital gains tax rates are not assumed to vary across
28 All random variables are denoted by a tilde.
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equity investors and time. Regarding their magnitude, we expect d g=  due to the possible
deferral of capital gains taxes. Under the common assumption that capital gains correspond to
changes in market value (e.g., Clubb & Doran, 1992; Cooper & Nyborg, 2008), the expected
market value of the unlevered firm, [ ]ut 1E V ,∃ , in period t 1,  is determined under a recursive
approach, as follows:
± ±[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( [ ] [ ]) [ ]
[ ]
change in market valuecash dividends retained free cash flows
 used for share repurchases
u u u
t tt d t g g t t 1 tu
t 1 u











,...,for t 1 T< . (69)
The cost of equity for the unlevered firm after personal taxes equals uke  and is assumed to be
given and constant over time. Note that equation (69) is consistent with prior research (Samu-
elson, 1964), that is, under a uniform personal tax rate, the cost of equity without personal taxes
is obtained by dividing the cost of equity with personal taxes uke  to one minus the uniform
personal tax rate.
Apparently, the taxation of changes in market value in (69) leads to a circularity problem be-
cause the market value in period t 1,  is included in the tax base for the taxation of capital
gains. However, this problem is overcome by solving equation (69) for the expected market
value in period t 1, . Additionally, dividing the numerator and denominator by ( )g1,  leads
to:
±
,[ ] ( ) [ ][ ]
r u
t E t tu
t 1 u








∃ , ,...,for t 1 T< , (70)
where , ( ) ( )
r
E t t d g g< √ , ,  represents the blended personal tax rate and
( )u u gke ke 1
)
< ,  the modified cost of equity of the unlevered firm. Specifically, the blended
personal tax rate ,
r
E t  considers all effects resulting from retentions and cash dividends due to
the differentiated personal taxation of cash dividends and capital gains. To obtain the blended
personal tax rate, ,
r
E t , we need to modify the unlevered cost of equity,
uke  and, consequently,
use uke
)
 when applying equation (70).29 Under different tax rates for cash dividends and effec-
tive capital gains, equation (70) indicates that the higher the payout ratio, tr , is, the higher the
29 In this context, it remains an open question how the blended personal tax rate is determined by Dempsey
(2017). Thus, the modification of the cost of equity is not calculated. Consequently, it is not possible to
use the blended personal tax rate without modifying the cost of equity.
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blended personal tax rate, ,
r
E t , is and, consequently, the lower the firm market value. Note that
the increase in firm market value only stems from the differences in personal tax rates regarding
cash dividends and effective capital gains (Rashid & Amoako-Adu, 1987). Therefore, if
d g< , equation (70) corresponds to Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) dividend policy irrele-
vance result and transforms into a valuation model without personal taxes.
Given a steady state, all expected values (e.g., EBIT and capital expenditures) increase at a
constant and uniform growth rate, g . Accordingly, the expected market value of the unlevered
firm also increases at this growth rate in (70) and, hence, [ ] [ ] ( )u ut t 1E V E V 1 g,< √ ∗∃ ∃ . Conse-
quently, we obtain the market value of the unlevered firm in the steady state as:
↓
±[ ] ( )[ ]
ru T 1 E
T
u






where payout ratio r  is constant and, consequently, ( ) ( )rE d g g< √ , ,  holds. Given
equations (70) and (71), the market value of the unlevered firm can be determined over an
explicit forecast period and a subsequent steady state, accounting for the firm’s dividend policy
in light of the differentiated personal taxes at the equity investor level.
4.3 Valuation model for the levered firm
Henceforth, we assume passive debt management, which is characterized by predetermined
debt levels, t 1D , , in period , ,...t 1 2< . In the steady state, all relevant values increase at a con-
stant and uniform growth rate, g , so that this growth also holds for debt levels and, conse-
quently ( )T 1 TD D 1 g∗ < √ ∗ . The debt market value equals debt book value. Because creditors
do not have to bear any risk, the cost of debt, kd , corresponds to the risk-free interest rate,
which is constant over time. Furthermore, we assume a constant corporate tax rate, , which is
independent of the amount of taxable income. Interest on debt is fully deductible from taxable
income (e.g., Miles & Ezzell, 1980; Modigliani & Miller, 1963). In the following, we focus on
determining equity market value according to the FtE approach because of the need to derive
appropriate adjustment formulas to actually apply this approach. The derivation of these adjust-
ment formulas in the explicit forecast period and steady state is especially important, as they
form the basis for the unlevering and relevering of beta factors in valuation practice. However,
besides the FtE approach, it is also possible to determine equity market value according to the
APV approach, as the market value of tax shields is the key component in deriving the adjust-
ment formulas.
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Following the argumentation in the preceding section, the expected cash dividend of the levered
firm, ±[ ]tE Div
κ
, is calculated as:30
± ±[ ] [ ]t ttE Div r E FtE< √
κ
, ,...,for t 1 T< , (72)
where the expected FtE, ±[ ]tE FtE , is defined as ± ±[ ] [ ] ( )t t t 1 tE FtE E FCF kd 1 D,< , √ , √ ∗ ,
with t t t 1D D D ,< ,  as the change in debt market value over period t . As the debt market
value is deterministic over each period, as per the assumption of passive debt management, FtE
can be determined without circularity problems. Then, the expected equity market value,
[ ]t 1E E ,
κ∃ , is:
± ±[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( [ ] [ ]) [ ]
[ ]
change in market valuecash dividends retained flow to equity
used for share repurchases
t tt d t g g t t 1 t
t 1
t














,...,for t 1 T< , (73)
where tke
κ  depicts the cost of equity for the levered firm. Note that equation (73) is similar to
(69), but refers to the expected FtE. Solving the circularity problem and dividing the numerator
and denominator by ( )g1, , we obtain:
±
,[ ] ( ) [ ][ ]
r
t E t t
t 1
t











∃ , ,...,for t 1 T< , (74)
where ( )t t gke ke 1
)
< ,κ κ  depicts the modified cost of equity of the levered firm. Equation
(74) is identical with equation (8) in Dempsey (2017) for ,
r
E E tq 1< ,  and ,E i tK ke
)
< κ .31 Thus,
equation (8) in Dempsey (2017) and equation (74) in this paper differ with regard to the speci-
fication of the blended personal tax rate and levered cost of equity. Specifically, the blended
value of Eq  in Dempsey (2017) is not further defined and thus how it is determined remains an
30 We expect that payout ratios tr  and r  are identical for the levered and unlevered firms.
31 Note that index i  in ,E iK  denotes the corresponding period. When comparing equation (74) with equation
(8) in Dempsey (2017), we note that the expected FtE in (74) can also be determined as:
± ± ↓
±[ ]
[ ] [ ] ( ) [ ] [ ] ( )
tE FCF
tt t t 1 ttE FtE E EBIT 1 E Q E I kd 1 D,< √ , ∗ , , √ , √ ∗
53333363333337
∃ , with [ ]tE Q∃  as the expected non-
cash adjustments and [ ]tE I∃  as expected investments.
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open question.32 Conversely, the blended personal tax rate, ,
r
E t , allows accounting for the div-
idend policy of the firm resulting from the different personal tax rates at the equity investor
level. Similar to the calculation of the modified cost of equity of the unlevered firm in the
preceding section, the modified levered cost of equity, tke
)
κ , in equation (74) results from the
derivation of the blended personal tax rate, ,
r
E t . As Dempsey (2017) does not specify blended
value Eq  the modification of the levered cost of equity, ,E iK , is consequently not calculated.
In this respect, the relation between ,E iK  and the blended value of Eq  is not revealed by equa-
tion (8) in Dempsey (2017).
Given a steady state, we obtain:












where ( )gke ke 1
)
< ,κ κ .33 Admittedly, equations (74) and (75) cannot be used, because the
costs of equity of the levered firm, tke
κ and keκ , are yet to be determined in the explicit forecast
period and steady state. The key component for the derivation of adjustment formulas is the
market value of tax shields, which is determined in the next section.
4.4 Market value of tax shields and cost of equity
To derive tax shields, we sum the FtE and flow to debt and respectively subtract the free cash
flow after personal taxes. As, under passive debt management, the debt market value, t 1D , , is
deterministic and assumed not to contain any default risk and the payout ratio, tr , is also deter-
ministic, the appropriate discount rate for the tax shields is the risk-free interest rate after per-
sonal taxes, ( )bkd 1√ , , for all periods.
32 In Dempsey (2017), the job of converting cash flows to market values is allocated to blended value Eq ,
which is rather unusual when dealing with DCF models. Accordingly, Dempsey defines his cost of equity,
,E iK , as market expected growth rate. However, do note that this does not alter the comparison.
33 Multiplying the numerator and denominator in (75) by ( )g1 ,  shows that, for g < , with  as the
inflation rate, the growth rate in equation (6) in Rashid and Amoako-Adu (1995) is not multiplied by one
minus the effective capital gains tax rate. In this respect, Rashid and Amoako-Adu (1995) refer also to a
blended personal tax rate, ,RA rE , defined as
, ( )RA rE d g1 r< √ ∗ , √  (similar to Cooper & Nyborg, 2004).
The difference from our derived personal tax rate results because the relation between the levered cost of
equity and the blended personal tax rate is neither disclosed by Rashid and Amoako-Adu (1995) nor by
Cooper and Nyborg (2004).
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Accordingly, we obtain the market value of tax shields, t 1VTS , , in the explicit forecast period
(see Appendix 4 for details):
( ) ( ( ) )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
t 1 t 1 t t d t g
t 1
b
t 1 b t g g t t 1 t
b
kd D kd D D 1 r 1 r
VTS
1 kd 1





√ √ , √ ∗ √ , √ , , √
<
∗ √ ,




,...,for t 1 T< , (76)
where b  is the constant personal tax rate of debt investors on interest, which is assumed not
to vary across them. Overall, we presume three different personal tax rates on cash dividends,
interest, and effective capital gains.34 Solving (76) for t 1VTS , , rearranging terms, and dividing
the numerator and denominator by ( )g1,  yields:
,, ,( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (
corporate tax shield change in debt tax shielddebt interest tax shield
rr r
t 1 E tt 1 E t t E tb t
t 1
b b b b
kd Dkd D 1 VTS
VTS
1 kd 1 1 kd 1 1 kd 1 1 kd 1
)
) ) ) )
,,
,
√ √ ,√ √ √ , √
< , , ∗




,...,for t 1 T< , (77)
where ( ) ( )b g gb) < , ,  is the modified personal tax rate at the debt investor level. Equa-
tion (77) shows that the market value of tax shields can be split into three parts. The corporate
tax shield results from the tax deductibility of interest in corporate tax base accounting for the
dividend policy of the firm and personal taxes. This tax shield is known from the valuation
calculation without personal taxes. The debt interest tax shield and the change in the debt tax
shield relate to the different personal taxations of equity and debt investors. Regarding the debt
interest tax shield, equity investor tax rates are affected by the payout ratio, while the debt
investor tax rate is not. The change in the debt tax shield relates to the different personal taxation
of the changes in debt market value, thus connecting the debt issue and redemption to higher or
lower distributed or retained cash flows. It is worth noting that the debt issue and redemption
are not subject to the personal taxation of debt investors. However, the change in debt market
value is tax-relevant for equity investors (e.g., Dempsey, 2017). In case of growth of the firm,
generally, ( )t t 1D kd 1 D ,= √ , √  holds and, consequently, equation (77) indicates that the
34 In several European countries, the tax rates on cash dividends and interests are identical and, thus, b d<
.
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higher the payout ratio, tr , is, the smaller are the modified tax shields in period t  (see Appendix
5 for further details).35
In the steady state, we obtain (see Appendix 6):






kd 1 g 1VTS D 1
kd 1 g)
∑ ⌡√ , , √ ,
< √ ,  √ , , 
. (78)
Equation (78) indicates that, in general, the higher the payout ratio, r , is, the higher are the
modified tax shields (see, again, Appendix 5). Hence, similar to higher debt levels, higher dis-
tributions increase the modified tax shields in (78). Compared to the value effect of the payout
ratio, tr , on the modified tax shields in case of growth of the firm in (77), the increase of the
modified tax shields in the steady state due to higher payout ratio r  in (78) is rather counterin-
tuitive because the cash dividend tax rate is actually higher than the effective capital gains tax
rate.
According to the APV approach, we can now determine firm market value by first determining
the market value of the unlevered firm (equations (70) and (71)), and then the market value of
tax shields (equations (77) and (78)) in the explicit forecast period and subsequent steady state.
To determine equity market value, we subtract debt market value from firm market value.
Linking equation (70) with equations (74) and (77), we can derive the levered cost of equity,
tke
κ , in period t  in the explicit forecast period (see Appendix 7 for details):
( ( ))
[ ]
u u t 1 t 1
t b
t 1





< ∗ , √ , √κ
κ∃
, ,...,for t 1 T< . (79)
Provided that the firm is in a steady state and thus substituting equation (78) in (79), we obtain:






kd 1 g 1ke ke ke kd 1 L r
kd 1 g)
√ , , √ ,
< ∗ , √ , √ √
√ , ,
κ , (80)
where ( ) [ ]T TL r D E E<
κ∃ . When multiplying the numerator and denominator in (80) by
( )g1 , , it becomes obvious that the adjustment formula in Rashid and Amoako-Adu’s (1995)
35 Note that equation (77) is identical to equation (21) in Dempsey (2017) for ,
r
E E tq 1< , , D bq 1 )< ,
 , Dr kd< , and ( )CTB bK kd 1 )< √ , . In Dempsey’s (2017) study, CTBK  serves as the risk-adjusted dis-
count rate for tax shields in equation (21). Consequently, when assuming passive debt management and
risk-free debt, CTBK  equals the risk-free interest rate after modifying personal taxes, ( )bkd 1 )√ , . Similar
to the previous section, the modified personal tax rate of debt investors,
b)
, results when deriving the




equation (7) does not account for the effective capital gains tax rate consistently as, for g < ,
with  as the inflation rate, the growth rate is not multiplied by one minus the effective capital
gains tax rate.
As the unlevering of beta factors is usually conducted assuming solely a steady state, the deri-
vation of asset betas according to the reformulation of equation (80) requires information about
the payout ratios of reference companies. In this regard, note that leverage ( )L r  in equation
(80) is dependent on payout ratio r , as the cash dividend tax rate exceeds the effective capital
gains tax rate. Concerning the effect of the dividend policy on the levered cost of equity, an
interesting result is that the level of the levered cost of equity, keκ , in the steady state is inde-
pendent of the level of payout ratio r  according to equation (80). This is because with, for
example, a higher payout ratio, r , rE  increases and ( ( ) ) ( )Ekd 1 g 1√ , , √ ,  accordingly de-
creases; however, ( )L r  increases because [ ]TE E
κ∃  decreases. Remarkably, the two opposite
value effects cancel each other out.36 This is even more surprising as, intuitively, with a higher
payout ratio, r , the more the levered cost of equity should increase due to the higher tax pay-
ments equity investors are obligated to from the difference in the cash dividend and effective
capital gains tax rates (Rashid & Amoako-Adu, 1987). Specifically, the adjustment formula in
(80) is identical for g 0< , rE Eq 1< , , D bq 1 )< , ,
u
UK ke< , EK ke<
κ , and
( )D D D bK r q kd 1 )< √ < √ ,  with equation (25) in Dempsey (2017).
37 Eventually, the derived
adjustment formulas in (79) and (80) resemble those developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958,
1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1980, 1985). Starting from the cost of equity, uke , which depicts
operating risk, a risk premium is added to incorporate financial risk.
Given adjustment formulas (79) and (80), the FtE approach is also applicable. However, as the
adjustment formulas require the equity market value as input parameter, the application of (74)
and (75) indicates circularity problems. These circularity problems easily can be solved using
a common spreadsheet software. However, in this respect, the APV approach has the advantage
that the valuation can be conducted without circularity problems.
36 This is because the blended personal tax rate, rE , cancels out of the adjustment formula in (80). However,
note that this simplification results in an adjustment formula with unobservable input parameters, which
causes difficulties when it comes to the unlevering of beta factors in valuation practice. For details, see
Appendix 8.
37 The substitution of equation (13) in (24) from Dempsey (2017) and solving for EK  leads to:
( ) ( )E U U D DK K K r q 1 1









< ,  and [ ]T TD E V<
κ∃ , which is identical
to equation (25) in Dempsey (2017) for D D DK r q< √ .
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4.5 Illustration of the implications of dividend policy on equity market value
Here, we examine how the valuation results vary depending on the level of payout ratio r . For
this, we compare a firm that fully distributes the FtE to its equity investors ( )r 1<  with a firm
that retains part of its FtE ( )r 1; . We first show a simple numerical example assuming a steady
state, in which all relevant values increase at a nominal growth rate, g . Firm 1 sets a payout
ratio of 100% and firm 2 of 50%. The other assumptions, which hold for both firms are:
±
%; %; %; . %; %;




g 1 30 25 12 5 kd 5
ke 10 D 2 000 E FCF 500
< < < < < <
< < <
 . (81)
We avoid the circularity problem associated with the FtE approach by first valuing the firm
according to the APV approach. Subsequently, leverage is known and we can value the firm
according to the FtE approach. The conducted valuations according to the APV approach for
firms 1 and 2 lead to the results in Table 1.
APV approach Firm 1 ( %)r 100< Firm 2 ( %)r 50<
Free cash flows after
blended personal taxes 429 464
Market value of the
unlevered firm
,4 110 ,4 452
Market value of
tax shields 696 587
Equity market value ,2 805 ,3 039
Leverage %71 %66
Table 1: Application of the APV approach.
The market value of the unlevered firm is calculated according to equation (71). Obviously, the
unlevered firm’s market value increases with decreasing payout ratio r  due to the higher cash
dividend tax rate compared to the effective capital gains tax rate. The market value of tax shields
is computed according to equation (78). Interestingly, the higher the payout ratio, r , is, the
more the market value of tax shields increases. Hence, the market value of tax shields has a
weakening effect on the personal tax advantage of retained cash flows compared to cash divi-
dends. Eventually, the equity market value is calculated as the sum of the market values of the
unlevered firm and of tax shields minus debt market value. Overall, Table 1 illustrates that
equity market value is higher, the lower payout ratio r  is. Consequently, the higher the payout
ratio, r , is, the higher is the leverage.
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From equation (75), the equity market value can be directly determined according to the FtE
approach for firms 1 and 2. For the calculation of the levered cost of equity (equation (80)), we
use the leverage in Table 1. The results of the application of the FtE approach are summarized
in Table 2.
FtE approach Firm 1 ( %)r 100< Firm 2 ( %)r 50<
Flow to equity after
blended personal taxes 386 418
Levered cost of equity . %14 75 . %14 75
Equity market value ,2 805 ,3 039
Table 2: Application of the FtE approach.
We note that, independently of the level of the payout ratio r , we calculate the same levered
cost of equity. Eventually, we obtain the same equity market values as under the APV approach.
To illustrate the implications of dividend policy on the equity market value for a more general
setting, we use simulations. For this, we assume two firms in a steady state. Firm 1 sets again a
deterministic payout ratio of 100%. Consequently, the calculation of the equity market value,
,r 1
0E
<κ , for firm 1 according to the FtE approach can be simplified to:
±











where ( ) ( )r 1E d g g
< < , , .38 As we calculate the same levered cost of equity inde-
pendently of the level of the payout ratio, r , we can also use equation (80) for determining the
modified levered cost of equity, ke
)
κ , in (82).
For firm 2, we assume payout ratio r  to be drawn from a uniform distribution, [ %; %]r 5 95⊆ .
To obtain an indication of the average expected valuation difference between firms 1 and 2,
1,000,000 valuation cases were simulated. We determine the percentage valuation difference in
terms of equity market value if equation (82) is used instead of equation (75), with
[ %; %]r 5 95⊆ . In this case, the percentage valuation difference p  is calculated as:





1 rE Ep 0
1E
< , √ ,,
< < ;




38 Note that r 1E1
<,  equals ( ) ( )d g1, ,  in footnote 1 in Dempsey (2017).
56
The equity investor tax rates are assumed to have the same values as those in the above numer-
ical example (see (81)). Based on these assumptions, the conducted simulation leads to the
frequency distribution of the percentage valuation difference in Figure. 6.
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of percentage valuation difference.
If (82) applies instead of (75), with [ %; %]r 5 95⊆ , the equity market value is always underes-
timated under our assumptions. The average valuation underestimation is approximately 7.6%,
while the minimum and maximum valuation underestimations are 0.8% and 13.7%. From equa-
tion (83), the valuation underestimation increases with a decreasing payout ratio r  and with the
increasing difference between the cash dividend and effective capital gains tax rates. Eventu-
ally, the simulation results show that the assumption of a full distribution of the FtE to equity
investors severely underestimates equity market value and emphasizes the relevance of our val-
uation model, especially for low payout ratios.
4.6 Conclusions
When incorporating personal taxes in DCF models, the dividend policy affects equity market
value, as the cash dividend tax rate exceeds the effective capital gains tax rate. Consequently,
the equity market value increases the more the firm engages in retaining cash flows. Thus, the
main results of this paper are the proposed valuation models, which allow considering the firm’s
dividend policy over an explicit forecast period and a subsequent steady state under passive
debt management. Specifically, we derive a blended personal tax rate, encapsulating all the
effects resulting from retentions and cash dividends. By specifying the blended personal tax
rate, we can actually apply the proposed valuation models. Furthermore, we reveal the impact
of the dividend policy on the cost of equity by deriving appropriate adjustment formulas for the
relationship between firm’s unlevered and levered costs of equity, while assuming both an ex-













the one in valuation literature, which do not consider personal taxes. Practitioners should note
that the unlevering of beta factors assuming a steady state requires information about the payout
ratios of the reference companies.
Conceptually, the FtE and APV approaches derived by Dempsey (2017) can be converted and
specified to the FtE and APV approaches in this study under the assumptions of passive debt
management and uniform blended personal tax rates. Specifically, the use of the blended per-
sonal tax rate results in modified cost of equities. In this respect, our approaches open the pos-
sibility for a more differentiated valuation approach, especially concerning the effects of divi-
dend policy on cash flows, tax shields, and cost of equity. This seems even more desirable, as
our simulation results show that the value contribution of the chosen dividend policy of a firm
on its equity market value is far from negligible: the average equity market value underestima-
tion is approximately 7.6% if the valuation model assumes the full distribution of the FtE to the
equity investors. Finally, further theoretical research could focus on different assumptions re-
garding a firm’s financing policy (e.g., active debt management) and dividend policy (e.g., ef-
fects of share repurchases) in consideration of personal taxes. Furthermore, the explicit consid-
eration of the default risk of debt might also be a promising future research field.
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5 Unlevering und Relevering mit „falschen“ Anpassungsformeln
, Wie schlimm ist das?
Stefan Dierkes, Hans-Christian Gröger, Nicole Rodzaj und Johannes Sümpelmann
erschienen in: Die Wirtschaftsprüfung, 71. Jg., 2018, S. 381-389.
In der Praxis der Unternehmensbewertung wird beim Unlevern und Relevern von Betafaktoren
und Kapitalkostensätzen regelmäßig auch dann eine auf Modigliani und Miller zurückgehende
Anpassungsformel angewendet, wenn die hierfür erforderlichen Voraussetzungen nicht erfüllt
sind. In diesem Beitrag werden zunächst die aus theoretischer Sicht korrekten Anpassungsfor-
meln in Abhängigkeit von der Berücksichtigung persönlicher Steuern, der Finanzierungspoli-
tik, dem Risiko des Fremdkapitals und dem Verlauf des freien Cashflows dargestellt. Mit Hilfe
von Simulationen wird dann analysiert, welche Bewertungsfehler entstehen, wenn nicht die
korrekten Anpassungsformeln zum Einsatz kommen. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass von einer
undifferenzierten Vorgehensweise beim Unlevern und Relevern Abstand zu nehmen ist.




Bei der Bewertung von Unternehmen mittels Discounted Cashflow (DCF) Verfahren werden
die Kapitalisierungszinssätze kapitalmarktorientiert mit dem Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) bestimmt. Das zentrale Risikomaß zur Ermittlung des Eigenkapitalkostensatzes ge-
mäß dem CAPM stellt das Equity Beta dar. Dieser Betafaktor gibt im Allgemeinen an, wie hoch
das relative und nicht über Portefeuillebildung diversifizierbare Risiko des Bewertungsobjekts
im Vergleich zum Gesamtkapitalmarkt ist. Das Equity Beta berücksichtigt zwei Risikokompo-
nenten. Dies ist zum einen das operative Risiko, das durch das Asset Beta erklärt wird und zum
anderen das Finanzierungsrisiko, das aus der Verschuldung resultiert. Zur Ermittlung des
Equity Betas wird zumeist auf Referenzunternehmen zurückgegriffen, deren operatives Risiko
mit dem des Bewertungsobjekts als vergleichbar angenommen wird. Da sich das Finanzie-
rungsrisiko zwischen Bewertungsobjekt und Referenzunternehmen üblicherweise unterschei-
det, ist das Equity Beta der Referenzunternehmen beim Unlevern um deren Finanzierungsrisiko
zu bereinigen und – sofern das zur Anwendung kommende DCF-Verfahren dies erfordert –
beim Relevern um das Finanzierungsrisiko des Bewertungsobjekts anzureichern. 39
Für das Unlevern und Relevern existieren verschiedene Anpassungsformeln, die sich bspw.
durch Annahmen hinsichtlich der Cashflow-Entwicklung oder der Finanzierungspolitik unter-
scheiden. Ebenso resultieren Unterschiede aus der Berücksichtigung oder Nicht-Berücksichti-
gung von persönlichen Steuern auf der Ebene der Kapitalgeber in Nach- bzw. Vorsteuerkalkü-
len sowie des Risikos des Fremdkapitals. Obwohl die Anwendung der Anpassungsformeln an
spezifische Voraussetzungen geknüpft ist, verwendet die Bewertungspraxis in der Regel zwei
vom IDW empfohlene, vergleichsweise einfache Anpassungsformeln. 40 Besonderer Beliebtheit
erfreut sich die auf Modigliani und Miller (M/M) zurückgehende Anpassungsformel, bei der
von einem Vorsteuerkalkül, dem Rentenfall ohne Wachstum, risikolosem Fremdkapital und
autonomer Finanzierung ausgegangen wird.41 Entspricht die Bewertungssituation nicht diesen
Annahmen – was nahezu stets der Fall ist – so wird der Unternehmenswert mit der M/M-An-
passungsformel ungenau und damit letztlich falsch ermittelt.42
Sofern man die Definition der Kapitalkosten wie Kruschwitz/Löffler/Lorenz (2011) wegen de-
ren empirischen Bestimmbarkeit und ökonomischen Interpretierbarkeit daran knüpft, dass es
sich hierbei um bedingte erwarte, aber deterministische Renditen handelt, ist mit einer autono-
men Finanzierung eine diesbezügliche Inkonsistenz verbunden. 43 Fraglich ist jedoch, ob man
39 Vgl. Diedrich/Dierkes, Unternehmensbewertung, Stuttgart 2015, S. 126 f. sowie Ballwieser/Hachmeister,
Unternehmensbewertung, 5. Aufl., Stuttgart 2016, S. 111.
40  Vgl. IDW, WP Handbuch, Band 2, 2014, Rn. A 371 und A 372.
41  Vgl. Kruschwitz/Löffler/Lorenz, WPg 2011, S. 672; IDW a.a.O. (Fn. 38), Rn. A 371.
42  Auch in der Literatur finden sich Beispiele eines undifferenzierten Rückgriffs auf die M/M Anpassungs-
formel. Vgl. z. B. Ernst/Amann/Großmann/Lump, Internationale Unternehmensbewertung, München 2012,
S. 83-86.
43 Vgl. Kruschwitz/Löffler/Lorenz, a.a.O. (Fn. 39); Kruschwitz/Löffler/Lorenz, WPg 2012, S. 1048-1052.
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hieraus den Schluss ziehen sollte, dass bei der Anpassung von Kapitalkosten auch dann die
Anpassungsformeln bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung verwendet werden sollten, wenn das Un-
ternehmen eine autonome Finanzierung verfolgt. In diesem Fall läge zwar keine Inkonsistenz
mit der Definition von Kapitalkosten als bedingte erwartete, aber deterministische Rendite vor,
jedoch würde dieses Vorgehen zu einem falschen Bewertungsergebnis führen, weil der Risiko-
gehalt der künftigen Tax Shields nicht korrekt berücksichtigt wird. Wir gehen daher in diesem
Beitrag wie in der Praxis üblich davon aus, dass im Fall einer autonomen Finanzierung Anpas-
sungsformeln verwendet werden, die zu dieser Finanzierungspolitik passen und mithin auf den
Überlegungen von Modigliani/Miller basieren. Hierbei sollte man sich jedoch darüber im Kla-
ren sein, dass die Ableitung von Kapitalkosten aus empirisch beobachtbaren Renditen dann
problematisch ist.44 Darüber hinaus ist bei autonomer Finanzierung zu berücksichtigen, dass
die künftigen Fremdkapitalquoten grundsätzlich unsicher sind und sich jeweils aus dem Quoti-
ent des deterministisch festgelegten Fremdkapitalbestands und des erwarteten Marktwerts des
verschuldeten Unternehmens ergeben. 45 Meitner/Streitferdt (2012) zeigen anhand eines Bei-
spiels, dass auf Basis ihrer Kapitalkostensatzdefinition auch bei dieser Konsequenz mittels der
M/M-Anpassungsformel korrekte Unternehmenswerte ermittelt werden können. 46
Vor dem Hintergrund des Einflusses der Wahl der Anpassungsformel auf das Bewertungser-
gebnis ist es erstaunlich, dass die Anpassungsformel in der Bewertungspraxis vielfach nicht mit
der konkreten Bewertungssituation abgestimmt wird. So wird die M/M-Anpassungsformel
bspw. in Nachsteuerkalkülen angewendet, obwohl aus der Berücksichtigung persönlicher Steu-
ern eigentlich die Notwendigkeit der Verwendung von spezifischen Nachsteuer-Anpassungs-
formeln erwächst. Eine standardisierte Anwendung etablierter Anpassungsformeln, die unab-
hängig von den tatsächlichen Gegebenheiten erfolgt, könnte man im Prinzip nur dadurch recht-
fertigen, dass der hieraus resultierende Bewertungsfehler vernachlässigbar gering ist. Bislang
mangelt es jedoch an einer systematischen Analyse der Bewertungsfehler, die mit der Anwen-
dung nicht zur Bewertungssituation passender und damit falscher Anpassungsformeln verbun-
den sind, sodass hierüber letztlich keine Aussage getroffen werden kann. Der vorliegende Bei-
trag zielt daher auf die Analyse dieser Bewertungsfehler ab, wobei wir uns der Methodik der
Simulation bedienen. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass zum Teil erhebliche Bewertungsfehler auf-
treten können. Hieraus leitet sich für die Praxis die Empfehlung ab, dass die Auswahl von An-
passungsformeln bei der Unternehmensbewertung differenzierter vorzunehmen ist.
Der Beitrag ist wie folgt aufgebaut. Im nachfolgenden Kapitel 2 werden die aus theoretischer
Sicht korrekten Anpassungsformeln für Betafaktoren in Abhängigkeit von der Finanzierungs-
44  Vgl. Kruschwitz/Löffler/Lorenz, a.a.O. (Fn. 41), S. 1051.
45  Vgl. hierzu Meitner/Streitferdt, WPg 2012, S. 1039; Diedrich/Dierkes a.a.O. (Fn. 37), S. 85-91.
46  Vgl. Meitner/Streitferdt, a.a.O. (Fn. 43), S. 1039-1041.
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politik, des Verlaufs des freien Cashflows und des Risikos des Fremdkapitals dargestellt. Dar-
über hinaus erfolgt eine Differenzierung in Vor- und Nachsteuerkalkülen, womit ein systema-
tischer Überblick über die in Abhängigkeit von der Bewertungssituation anzuwendende Anpas-
sungsformel gegeben wird, wie man ihn in der Literatur bislang nicht findet. Im Kapitel 3 wird
mittels Simulationen analysiert, welche Bewertungsfehler entstehen können, wenn anstelle der
korrekten eine unpassende Anpassungsformel verwendet wird. Im abschließenden Kapitel 4
wird auf die sich hieraus ergebenden Schlussfolgerungen für die Praxis der Unternehmensbe-
wertung eingegangen.
5.2 Anpassungsformeln aus theoretischer Sicht
Für die Wahl der richtigen Anpassungsformel für das Un- und Relevern von Betafaktoren sind
die nachfolgenden Fragen entscheidend:
a) Liegt in Bezug auf die Besteuerung der Kapitalgeber ein Vorsteuer- oder ein Nachsteuer-
kalkül vor?
b) Welche Finanzierungspolitik wird angenommen?
c) Ist das Fremdkapital ausfallgefährdet?
d) Welchen Verlauf haben die freien Cashflows?
Im Weiteren wird zunächst von einem Vorsteuerkalkül ausgegangen, bei dem nur Steuern be-
rücksichtigt werden, die auf der Unternehmensebene anfallen. Die persönliche Besteuerung auf
Ebene der Kapitalgeber wird hierbei vernachlässigt und erst später bei den Anpassungsformeln
für Nachsteuerkalküle berücksichtigt.
In Bezug auf die Finanzierungspolitik wird bei der Unternehmensbewertung zwischen einer
autonomen und einer wertabhängigen Finanzierung unterschieden. Kennzeichen der den Bei-
trägen von M/M zugrunde liegenden autonomen Finanzierung ist, dass die Fremdkapitalbe-
stände zum Bewertungszeitpunkt deterministisch festgelegt werden. Bei wertabhängiger Finan-
zierung werden hingegen die Fremdkapitalquoten oder die Verschuldungsgrade zum Bewer-
tungszeitpunkt deterministisch bestimmt. Während man bei einer wertabhängigen Finanzierung
gemäß Miles und Ezzell (M/E) davon ausgeht, dass die Fremdkapitalbestände nur zu Beginn
einer Periode an die Fremdkapitalquote angepasst werden können, wird bei der wertabhängigen
Finanzierung gemäß Harris und Pringle (H/P) unterstellt, dass die Anpassung der Fremdkapi-
talbestände kontinuierlich vorgenommen werden kann. 47
47 Vgl. Drukarczyk/Schüler, Unternehmensbewertung, 7. Aufl., München 2016, S.162-170 oder Ballwie-
ser/Hachmeister, a.a.O. (Fn. 37), S. 156 f.
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Das Ausfallrisiko des Fremdkapitals wird im Credit Spread (cst) abgebildet, der die Differenz
zwischen dem Fremdkapitalzinssatz und dem risikolosen Zinssatz angibt. Solange das Ausfall-
risiko von Unternehmen nicht zu hoch ist, kann der Fremdkapitalzinssatz als hinreichend gute
Annäherung für den Fremdkapitalkostensatz angesehen und dementsprechend in DCF Verfah-
ren verwendet werden.48 Wenn der Fremdkapitalkostensatz (kdt) größer als der risikolose Zins-
satz des Kapitalmarktes (rt) ist, impliziert dies gemäß dem CAPM ein Debt Beta ( D) größer
null.49 Bezeichnet MRP die Marktrisikoprämie, gilt für den Fremdkapitalkostensatz gemäß dem
CAPM Formel (1), wobei periodenspezifische Größen mit dem Index t gekennzeichnet sind.
D
t t tkd = r +MRP √ , (1)
Sofern der Fremdkapitalkostensatz kd t bekannt ist, kann mittels Umstellung das Debt Beta er-
mittelt werden.50 Es folgt Formel (2).
D t t t
t
kd r cs= =
MRP MRP
, (2)
In Bezug auf den Verlauf der freien Cashflows ist zu beachten, ob eine Detailprognose- oder
Rentenphase vorliegt und in der Rentenphase von einem inflations- und/oder realen Wachstum
ausgegangen wird. In der Detailprognosephase mit schwankenden freien Cashflows sind die
Betafaktoren bei autonomer Finanzierung auch bei konstantem Debt Beta grundsätzlich perio-
denspezifisch anzupassen, weil sich das Finanzierungsrisiko bei deterministisch festgelegten
Fremdkapitalbeständen verändert. Bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung ist eine periodenspezifi-
sche Anpassung von Betafaktoren bei konstantem Debt Beta hingegen nur dann erforderlich,
wenn die Fremdkapitalquote nicht für alle Perioden einheitlich festgelegt wird. Sofern das Debt
Beta jedoch periodenspezifisch ist, muss die Anpassung sowohl bei autonomer als auch bei
wertabhängiger Finanzierung periodenspezifisch vorgenommen werden. In der Rentenphase
sind die Betafaktoren hingegen bei beiden Finanzierungspolitiken periodenkonstant. Während
der Betafaktor aber bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung unabhängig von der Wachstumsrate ist,
wird dieser bei autonomer Finanzierung von ihr beeinflusst.
In der folgenden Übersicht 1 sind die Anpassungsformeln für Betafaktoren bei einem Vorsteu-
erkalkül für autonome und wertabhängige Finanzierung zusammenfassend dargestellt.
48  Vgl. Ballwieser/Hachmeister, a.a.O. (Fn. 37), S. 56.
49  Zum Unterschied zwischen Fremdkapitalzinssatz, Fremdkapitalkostensatz sowie risikolosen Zinssatz siehe
bspw. Koller/Goedhart/Wessels, Valuation, 6. Aufl., Hoboken 2015, S. 304-307.
50  Vgl. Kruschwitz/Löffler/Lorenz, a.a.O. (Fn. 39), S. 678; IDW, a.a.O. (Fn. 38), S. 129, Rn. A 372; Kuh-
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Symbolverzeichnis
u = Asset Beta
 = Equity Beta
D = Debt Beta
kd = Fremdkapitalkostensatz
w = Wachstumsfaktor
E[ ] = Erwartungswertoperator
D = Marktwert des Fremdkapitals
E = Marktwert des Eigenkapitals
L = Verschuldungsgrad
VTS = Marktwert der Tax Shield
 = Teilsteuersatz bezogen auf die Fremdkapitalzinsen
Übersicht 1: Anpassungsformeln bei einem Vorsteuerkalkül.
Bei der Bestimmung des Equity Betas sind unter anderem das Asset Beta und das Debt Beta zu
berücksichtigen. Das Asset Beta trägt dem systematischen operativen Risiko des Unterneh-
mens Rechnung, wobei den Anpassungsformeln die gängige Annahme zugrunde liegt, dass das
Asset Beta im Zeitablauf konstant ist. In dem Debt Beta kommt das von den Fremdkapitalge-
bern zu tragende Risiko zum Ausdruck,51 wobei alle Anpassungsformeln darin übereinstim-
men, dass das Debt Beta mindernd auf die Höhe des Equity Betas und damit des Eigenkapi-
talkostensatzes wirkt. Nur bei nicht-ausfallgefährdetem Fremdkapital entspricht der Fremdka-
pitalkostensatz der sicheren Verzinsung und das Debt Beta ist null. 52
51 Vgl. Copeland/Weston/Shastri, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 4. Aufl., Essex 2014, S. 545-554.
52  Vgl. Brealey/Myers/Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance, 12. Aufl., New York 2017, S. 604-606.
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Die Unterschiede bei den Anpassungsformeln resultieren insbesondere aus der Finanzierungs-
politik und dem damit zusammenhängenden Risikogehalt der Tax Shields. Bei Annahme einer
autonomen Finanzierung sind die Fremdkapitalbestände künftiger Perioden deterministisch ge-
plant. Unsicherheit bezüglich der künftigen Tax Shields besteht nur in dem Maße, in dem das
Fremdkapital ausfallgefährdet ist. Aus diesem Grund werden die Tax Shields wie die Zahlun-
gen an die Fremdkapitalgeber mit dem Fremdkapitalkostensatz diskontiert, der dem Ausfallri-
siko Rechnung trägt. Dagegen begründet sich die Unsicherheit der Tax Shields bei wertabhän-
giger Finanzierung vor allem in der Abhängigkeit des Marktwerts des Fremdkapitals vom
Marktwert des verschuldeten Unternehmens. Die bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung relevanten
Bewertungsansätze von H/P und M/E weichen wegen der unterschiedlichen Annahmen in Be-
zug auf die Anpassung der Fremdkapitalbestände ab. Die Annahmen von M/E führen dazu,
dass der Tax Shield in der Periode seiner Entstehung  mit dem Fremdkapitalkostensatz und in
allen vorhergehenden Perioden mit dem Eigenkapitalkostensatz des unverschuldeten Unterneh-
mens zu diskontieren ist.53 Bei H/P mit einer kontinuierlichen Anpassung der Fremdkapitalbe-
stände an den Verschuldungsgrad weisen die Tax Shields hingegen in allen Perioden das glei-
che Risiko wie das operative Geschäft auf, weshalb sie stets mit dem Eigenkapitalkostensatz
des unverschuldeten Unternehmens zu diskontieren sind.54 Daraus folgt, dass die Höhe des
Equity Betas bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung gemäß M/E unter sonst gleichen Bedingungen
niedriger als bei H/P ist. Zudem ist das Equity Beta bei autonomer Finanzierung durch den
geringeren Risikogehalt der Tax Shields unter sonst gleichen Bedingungen. immer kleiner als
bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung.55
Wird die Bewertung nicht mit einem Vorsteuerkalkül, sondern mit einem Nachsteuerkalkül
durchgeführt, sind eigenständige Anpassungsformeln anzuwenden, die grundsätzlich nicht mit
den Anpassungsformeln für Vorsteuerkalküle übereinstimmen. Übersicht 2 fasst die Anpas-
sungsformeln für ein Nachsteuerkalkül zusammen.56
53 Vgl. Miles/Ezzell, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1980, S. 722-726.
54  Vgl. Harris/Pringle, The Journal of Financial Research, 1985, S. 240 f.
55  Vgl. Harris/Pringle, a.a.O (Fn. 52), S. 240.
56  Für die bei einem Nachsteuerkalkül zu verwendenden Anpassungsformeln bei autonomer und wertabhän-
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Symbolverzeichnis
sd = persönlicher Steuersatz auf Dividenden und Zinsen
sg = persönlicher Steuersatz auf Kursgewinne bzw. Marktwertzuwächse
Übersicht 2: Anpassungsformeln bei einem Nachsteuerkalkül.
Der Index s gibt an, dass es sich um Größen nach persönlichen Steuern handelt. Zur Berück-
sichtigung des Steuerstundungseffektes bei der Kursgewinnsteuer wird der persönliche Steuer-
satz auf Dividenden und Zinsen sd üblicherweise niedriger als der persönliche Steuersatz auf
Kursgewinne bzw. Marktwertzuwächse sg angesetzt.57 Da Fremdkapitalzinsen der Besteuerung
durch sd unterliegen, muss auch ein Debt Beta nach persönlichen Steuern verwendet werden.
Für das Debt Beta in einem Nachsteuerkalkül gilt Formel (17):
, ( ) ( ) s sD s t d t d t t
t s s
kd 1 s r 1 s kd r
MRP MRP
√ , , √ , ,
< < (17)
Bei der Bestimmung des Marktwertes des Tax Shield in einer Nachsteuerrechnung ist zu be-
rücksichtigen, dass in diesen zwei Komponenten eingehen: Der unternehmensteuerbedingte
Tax Shield ergibt sich wie in Vorsteuerkalkülen aus der steuerlichen Abzugsfähigkeit der
Fremdkapitalzinsen von der Bemessungsgrundlage der Unternehmensteuern, wobei in einem
Nachsteuerkalkül die persönliche Besteuerung der Kapitalgeber ergänzend zu berücksichtigen
57  Vgl. zum Steuerstundungseffekt Wiese, WPg 2007, S. 368-375.
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ist. In Nachsteuerkalkülen ist mit dem einkommensteuerbedingten Tax Shield eine zweite
Komponente einzubeziehen, die darauf zurückzuführen ist, dass die Aufnahme von Fremdka-
pital einen Ausschüttungsverzicht substituiert, der für die Eigenkapitalgeber steuerlich relevant
ist, während hiermit bei den Fremdkapitalgebern keine steuerlichen Konsequenzen verbunden
sind.58
Bezüglich der Auswirkungen der Finanzierungspolitik, des Risikogehalts des Fremdkapitals
und des Verlaufs des freien Cashflows auf die Höhe des Equity Betas kann auf die entsprechen-
den Ausführungen bei den Anpassungsformeln für Vorsteuerkalküle verwiesen werden. Ein
Vergleich der Anpassungsformeln bei Vor- und Nachsteuerkalkülen zeigt zwar, dass diese
strukturell eine große Ähnlichkeit aufweisen, jedoch werden die Anpassungsformeln im Nach-
steuerkalkül durch die persönliche Besteuerung beeinflusst. Selbst wenn man, wie in der Be-
wertungspraxis üblich, vereinfachend davon ausgeht, dass das Asset Beta im Nachsteuerkalkül
mit dem im Vorsteuerkalkül übereinstimmt, so wird das Equity Beta im Nachsteuerkalkül durch
das von der persönlichen Besteuerung abhängige Debt Beta beeinflusst. Nur wenn man darüber
hinaus annimmt, dass das Fremdkapital risikolos ist, stimmen die Anpassungsformeln bei au-
tonomer Finanzierung im Rentenfall ohne Wachstum und bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung ge-
mäß H/P im Vor- und Nachsteuerkalkül überein. Die Anwendung der H/P Anpassungsformel
ist hierbei zusätzlich noch mit dem Vorteil verbunden, dass sie unabhängig vom Teilsteuersatz
der Fremdkapitalzinsen ist, was insbesondere bei Unternehmen mit mehreren Geschäftsberei-
chen zu einer Vereinfachung der Bewertung führt.59
5.3 Analyse der Bewertungsfehler durch die Verwendung „falscher“
Anpassungsformeln
Die vergleichsweise geringe Komplexität und gute Verständlichkeit der M/M Anpassungsfor-
mel für den Rentenfall ohne Wachstum (Formel 5) und der H/P Anpassungsformel (Formel 8
bzw. 9) eines Vorsteuerkalküls sowie deren Anwendungsempfehlung im WP Handbuch tragen
wesentlich dazu bei, dass diese in der Bewertungspraxis zumeist angewendet werden. Wie die
Ausführungen im vorangegangen Kapitel jedoch deutlich gemacht haben, ist die Anwendung
von Anpassungsformeln an spezifische Voraussetzungen geknüpft. Wenn diese in Bewertungs-
situationen nicht erfüllt sind, so führt die Anwendung unpassender und damit falscher Anpas-
sungsformeln zu Bewertungsfehlern. Als Ursachen für die Verwendung einer falschen Anpas-
sungsformel kommt den nachfolgenden Punkten eine besondere Bedeutung zu:
58  Zur Bestimmung des Marktwertes des Tax Shields in einer Nachsteuerrechnung siehe insb. Diedrich/Dier-
kes, a.a.O. (Fn. 39), S. 112 f.
59  Der Gesamtkapitalkostensatz beim TCF Verfahren ist bei H/P in einem Vorsteuerkalkül finanzierungsun-
abhängig.
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Erstens vernachlässigt die Bewertungspraxis bei der Anpassung von Betafaktoren oftmals das
Debt Beta, was nur bei risikolosem Fremdkapital gerechtfertigt ist. Zweitens ist davon auszu-
gehen, dass der Rentenfall ohne Wachstum sowohl in der Detailprognosephase als auch in der
Rentenphase nicht der Realität entspricht. Insofern ist die Verwendung der M/M Anpassungs-
formel für den Rentenfall ohne Wachstum, auf die im Handbuch der Wirtschaftsprüfer in be-
sonderer Weise Bezug genommen wird, auch bei autonomer Finanzierung letztlich in allen Pe-
rioden mit Fehlern verbunden. Drittens führt die M/M Anpassungsformel zu einem Bewer-
tungsfehler, wenn das zu bewertende Unternehmen eine wertabhängige Finanzierung verfolgt,
wovon in der Bewertungspraxis regelmäßig ausgegangen wird. Viertens ist eine Differenzie-
rung zwischen einem Vor- und einem Nachsteuerkalkül notwendig, da bei einem Nachsteuer-
kalkül grundsätzlich eigenständige Anpassungsformeln zu verwenden sind.
Im Weiteren wird analysiert, wie groß die Bewertungsfehler sind, wenn von den tatsächlichen
Bewertungssituationen abweichende und demnach „falsche“ Anpassungsformeln zur Anwen-
dung kommen. Um die Auswirkungen der Verwendung einer „falschen“ Anpassungsformel auf
den Marktwert des Eigenkapitals aufzuzeigen, werden 1.000.000 Bewertungsfälle simuliert.
Hierbei wird folgende Bewertungssituation unterstellt:
∂ Rentenfall mit Wachstum
∂ gegebener freier Cashflow
∂ Anwendung des FtE-Verfahrens
Die Ausprägungen der für die Bewertung relevanten Größen werden als voneinander unabhän-
gig und in den folgenden Intervallen gleichverteilt angenommen: 60
 [20%;40%], w  [0,5%;1,5%], MRP  [5,5%;7%], cs  [1%;4%]
u = u,s  [0,8;1,5],  [30%;70%], MRPs [5%;6%]
 symbolisiert die Fremdkapitalquote, wobei sich der Verschuldungsgrad L aus /(1, )
ergibt. Bei der Analyse des Nachsteuerkalküls werden ein konstanter Steuersatz auf Dividenden
und Zinsen in Höhe von 26,375% und ein Steuersatz auf Kursgewinne bzw. Marktwertzu-
wächse in Höhe von 13,188% angesetzt. Vereinfachend wird davon ausgegangen, dass das As-
set Beta nach persönlichen Steuern mit dem Asset Beta vor persönlichen Steuern überein-
stimmt.
In der Übersicht 3 sind die in der Simulation ermittelten durchschnittlichen Bewertungsfehler
sowie ergänzend in den eckigen Klammern jeweils die Bandbreiten der möglichen Fehler an-
gegeben. Insgesamt werden mit einem Vor- und einem Nachsteuerkalkül bei autonomer und
60  Die Marktrisikoprämien vor und nach persönlichen Steuern orientieren sich an den vom Fachausschuss
der Unternehmensbewertung (FAUB) empfohlenen Bandbreiten. Vgl. IDW (Hrsg.), IDW Fachnachrich-
ten 2012, S. 568-569.
68
wertabhängiger Finanzierung vier Bewertungssituationen betrachtet, wobei von einer wertab-
hängigen Finanzierung gemäß M/E ausgegangen wird. Bei dem Vorsteuerkalkül bei autonomer
Finanzierung (Fall A) liefert z. B. die Anwendung der M/M Anpassungsformel mit Wachstum
und Debt Beta das richtige Bewertungsergebnis, was in der Tabelle durch einen dunkelgrauen
Hintergrund dieses Feldes gekennzeichnet ist. Als mögliche alternative Anpassungsformeln
werden in dieser Situation die M/M Anpassungsformel mit Wachstum bei Vernachlässigung
des Debt Betas, die M/M Anpassungsformeln ohne Wachstum sowie die H/P Anpassungsfor-
meln untersucht. Demnach ist bspw. die M/M Anpassungsformel mit Wachstum bei Vernach-
lässigung des Debt Betas mit einem mittleren Bewertungsfehler von ,11,2% verbunden, wobei
die Bandbreite der Bewertungsfehler zwischen ,34,3% und 9,7% liegt. Da die Anwendung der
M/E Anpassungsformeln sowie auch die Anwendung der Anpassungsformeln eines Nachsteu-
erkalküls in dieser Bewertungssituation nicht realistisch sind, werden die Auswirkungen dieser
Anpassungen nicht analysiert, was in der Tabelle an dem hellgrauen Hintergrund dieser Tabel-
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Übersicht 3: Simulationsergebnisse , Durchschnitte und Bandbreiten der Bewertungsfehler im Rentenfall mit
Wachstum.
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Insgesamt zeigen die Ergebnisse der Simulation, dass die Anwendung einer unpassenden An-
passungsformel mit erheblichen Bewertungsfehlern verbunden sein kann. Der maximale mitt-
lere Bewertungsfehler in Höhe von ,26,0% tritt auf, wenn in einem Nachsteuerkalkül bei au-
tonomer Finanzierung (Fall C) die H/P Anpassungsformel ohne Debt Beta des Vorsteuerkalküls
angewendet wird. Aber auch aus einem geringen mittleren Bewertungsfehler kann nicht ohne
weiteres die Schlussfolgerung gezogen werden, dass eine unpassende Anpassungsformel in ei-
ner Bewertungssituation angewendet werden kann. Ergänzend ist auch die Bandbreite der mög-
lichen Bewertungsfehler zu berücksichtigen. So ist die Anwendung der M/M Anpassungsfor-
mel mit Wachstum und Debt Beta im Fall C nur mit einem mittleren Bewertungsfehler von
2,2% verbunden, jedoch liegen die maximale Unter- und Überbewertung bei ,27,0% bzw.
23,9%. Insofern kann man unter Berücksichtigung des Durchschnitts und der Bandbreite der
möglichen Bewertungsfehler im Prinzip nur in einem Vorsteuerkalkül die Anwendung der H/P
Anpassungsformel mit Debt Beta rechtfertigen, obwohl von der wertabhängigen Finanzierung
gemäß M/E (Fall B) ausgegangen wird. In einem Nachsteuerkalkül (Fall D) wäre eine dement-
sprechende Vereinfachung mit einem mittleren Bewertungsfehler von ,5,8% hingegen als
problematisch einzustufen. Im Folgenden soll auf drei für die Praxis besonders relevante Prob-
lembereiche näher eingegangen werden:
Der erste Problembereich betrifft die in der Praxis vielfach angewandte M/M Anpassungsfor-
mel für den Rentenfall ohne Wachstum und Debt Beta (Formel 5). Ein Blick auf die Durch-
schnitte und Bandbreiten der Bewertungsfehler in allen Bewertungssituationen zeigt, dass diese
nie zu einer akzeptablen Bewertung führt. In dem Vorsteuerkalkül bei wertabhängiger Finan-
zierung (Fall B) ist zwar der mittlere Bewertungsfehler mit ,2,9% noch gering, jedoch ist die
Bandbreite der Bewertungsfehler von ,35,7% bis 27,1% groß. Bemerkenswert ist zudem, dass
die M/M Anpassungsformel ohne Wachstum mit Debt Beta selbst in dem Vorsteuerkalkül bei
autonomer Finanzierung (Fall A) nur zu unbefriedigenden Lösungen führt, wodurch die Be-
deutsamkeit der Berücksichtigung der Wachstumsrate in den Anpassungsformeln bei autono-
mer Finanzierung im Rentenfall deutlich wird.
Zweitens ist regelmäßig ein erheblicher Fehler mit einer Vernachlässigung des Debt Betas ver-
bunden, wenn der Fremdkapitalkostensatz den risikolosen Zinssatz übersteigt. Wird bspw. bei
autonomer Finanzierung die Anpassungsformel (4) mit einem Debt Beta von null verwendet,
führt dies zu einer durchschnittlichen Unterschätzung des Unternehmenswerts von ,11,2% bei
einem Vorsteuerkalkül (Fall A) und von ,7,7% bei einem Nachsteuerkalkül (Fall C). Würde
man bei der Anpassung darüber hinaus die Wachstumsrate nicht berücksichtigen und Formel
(5) ohne Debt Beta anwenden, würde dies die durchschnittlichen Bewertungsfehler auf ,17,4%
bzw. ,14,5% erhöhen. Ergänzend ist zu beachten, dass in der Simulation angenommen wurde,
dass der Verschuldungsgrad und der Credit Spread unabhängig voneinander sind. Würde man
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in der Simulation einen positiven funktionalen Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Größen unter-
stellen, wovon in der Realität auszugehen ist,61 so würde dies die ermittelten durchschnittlichen
Bewertungsfehler erhöhen.
Der dritte Problembereich resultiert daraus, dass in Nachsteuerkalkülen spezifische Nach-
steuer-Anpassungsformeln anzuwenden sind, was in der Praxis im Allgemeinen nicht ge-
schieht.62 In der Regel werden die aus Vorsteuerkalkülen bekannten Anpassungsformeln ver-
wendet, womit erhebliche Bewertungsfehler verbunden sein können. Wird in einem Nachsteu-
erkalkül bei wertabhängiger Finanzierung (Fall D) bspw. die Vorsteuer-M/E Anpassungsformel
mit Debt Beta angewendet, so ist dies mit einem durchschnittlichen Bewertungsfehler von
,5,4% verbunden.
5.4 Fazit
In der Bewertungspraxis werden bei der Anpassung von Betafaktoren häufig vergleichsweise
einfache Anpassungsformeln angewendet, obwohl die hierfür notwendigen Anwendungsvo-
raussetzungen nicht erfüllt sind. In diesem Beitrag wurde mittels einer Simulation gezeigt, dass
hiermit erhebliche Bewertungsfehler verbunden sein können. Die Auswahl der Anpassungsfor-
mel sollte daher stets in Abhängigkeit von der Berücksichtigung persönlicher Steuern, der Fi-
nanzierungspolitik, des Risikos des Fremdkapitals und damit eines Debt Betas sowie des Ver-
laufs des freien Cashflows erfolgen. Die Anwendung einer einfachen Anpassungsformel lässt
sich u. E. nicht mit Praktikabilitätsgründen rechtfertigen, weil die Bewertung in der Praxis oh-
nehin mit Tabellenkalkulationsprogrammen vorgenommen wird, womit alle Anpassungsfor-
meln letztlich in gleichem Maße praktikabel sind. Nur in dem Sonderfall, in dem die Referenz-
unternehmen und das zu bewertende Unternehmen bzgl. aller Anwendungsvoraussetzungen
identisch sind, ist die Wahl der Anpassungsformel beim Un- und Relevern irrelevant, weil das
am Kapitalmarkt beobachtbare Raw Beta dann mit dem Equity Beta übereinstimmt. Da dieses
jedoch in der Regel nicht gegeben ist, sollte man der Wahl der geeigneten Anpassungsformel
beim Un- und Relevern besondere Beachtung schenken. Für die Bewertungspraxis sind hierbei
die nachfolgenden Punkte von besonderer Relevanz:
∂ Die Anwendung der M/M Anpassungsformel für den Rentenfall ohne Wachstum ist in al-
len Bewertungssituationen mit erheblichen Bewertungsfehlern verbunden. Dieses gilt so-
gar bei autonomer Finanzierung für die Rentenphase, wenn dort von einem Wachstum der
freien Cashflows auszugehen ist.
61  Vgl. Copeland/Weston/Shastri, a.a.O. (Fn. 49), S. 553 f.
62  Vgl. Diedrich/Dierkes, WPg 2017, S. 208f.
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∂ Die Wahl einer Anpassungsformel für autonome Finanzierung bei wertabhängiger Finan-
zierung und umgekehrt hat gravierende Auswirkungen auf das Bewertungsergebnis und
sollte vermieden werden.
∂ In einem Vorsteuerkalkül kann die H/P Anpassungsformel vereinfachend auch bei wertab-
hängiger Finanzierung gemäß M/E angewendet werden. Die H/P Anpassungsformel weist
zudem den Vorteil auf, dass diese unabhängig von den Teilsteuersätzen der Fremdkapital-
zinsen ist. In einem Nachsteuerkalkül ergibt sich ein weiterer Vorteil daraus, dass die Vor-
steuer-Anpassungsformel auch in einem Nachsteuerkalkül angewendet werden kann, wenn
das Fremdkapital risikolos ist und man von der Übereinstimmung des Asset Betas vor und
nach persönlichen Steuern ausgeht.
∂ Sofern das Fremdkapital risikobehaftet und damit der Fremdkapitalkostensatz größer als
der risikolose Zinssatz ist, ist das Debt Beta bei der Anpassung von Betafaktoren zu be-
rücksichtigen.
∂ Im Allgemeinen führt die Anwendung von Vorsteuer-Anpassungsformeln in Nachsteuer-
kalkülen zu erheblichen Bewertungsfehlern. Demzufolge sollten in Nachsteuerkalkülen
auch die spezifischen Nachsteuer-Anpassungsformeln eingesetzt werden.
73
6 Conclusions
6.1 Summary and implications
Firm valuations are conducted regularly using DCF models. In this context, the corporate tax
deductibility of interest induces tax shields, which in turn enhance the equity market value. The
appropriate discount rate for these tax shields is closely related to the firm’s financing policy.
In this respect, most valuation literature refers to passive or active debt management; the market
value of tax shields is generally higher under passive debt management than under an active
one. Hence, a firm’s chosen financing policy affects the level of equity market value. In addition
to the financing policy, the dividend policy also affects the equity market value, as the cash
dividend tax rate exceeds the effective capital gains tax rate. Thus, the equity market value
increases with an increase in a firm’s participation in retaining cash flows or repurchasing
shares. Consequently, both financing and dividend policies affect the equity market value in
light of personal taxes. Accordingly, the aim of this thesis was to develop consistent and theo-
retically sound valuation models that consider the firm’s financing and dividend policy simul-
taneously. In this respect, theoretical research in the area of corporate valuation is particularly
concerned with deriving appropriate adjustment formulas for the relationship between the
firm’s unlevered and levered costs of equity. Consequently, besides the financing policy, divi-
dend policy, and personal taxes, the forecast horizon and default risk of debt also need to be
considered further.
The first study, Terminal value calculation with constant payout ratio and active debt manage-
ment, shows that, under active debt management, the tax-driven value effects of the dividend
policy lead to an additional debt financing to adhere to the predetermined capital structure tar-
get. This induces additional interests, tax shields, and changes in the debt market value, which,
in turn, affect the flow to equity. Eventually, the additional debt effects result in a complex
valuation model of the levered firm, which differs from the standard terminal value model ap-
plied in the valuation practice. Conceptually, it becomes evident that the assumed financing and
dividend policy is not implemented consistently in the standard terminal value model. From a
practical perspective, it is shown that overestimation of the equity market value in the steady
state occurs by not accounting for the additional debt financing effects, under otherwise identi-
cal assumptions. The overestimation of the value contribution of an earnings-based dividend
policy is above 50% in extreme cases, depending on the parameters.
The second study, Valuation with share repurchases and personal taxes, considers that share
repurchases have become an important alternative for distributing cash flows to equity inves-
tors, which is not least due to the tax advantage they provide when compared with cash divi-
dends. In the derived valuation model, the equity market value is calculated as the equity market
value without tax shields from retained cash flows and an added equity market value from tax
shields from retained cash flows. Here, the tax shields from retained cash flows represent the
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tax advantage of the retained over the distributed cash flows. This approach might be advanta-
geous for practitioners, as it clearly accounts for the dividend policy’s relevance and value ef-
fects in light of personal taxes in a straightforward manner. Additionally, the effects of share
repurchases on the cost of equity are disclosed by deriving appropriate adjustment formulas
under active debt management assuming an explicit forecast period and a subsequent steady
state. The derived adjustment formulas in the cases of Miles and Ezzell and Harris and Pringle
are similar to the known adjustment formulas under active debt management without personal
taxes, but they consider personal taxes in both the cases. It is worth noting that the adjustment
formula in the case of Miles and Ezzell is dependent on the cash dividend ratio and hence ac-
counts for the tax advantage of share repurchases. As a result, besides leverage, the financial
risk of a firm increases with an increase in the firm’s participation in share repurchases. Con-
versely, the adjustment formula in the case of Harris and Pringle is independent of the cash
dividend ratio. This might be especially beneficial for practitioners, as this ratio does not need
to be specified for the unlevering and relevering of beta factors. Eventually, the developed val-
uation models can be applied without circularity problems in corporate valuation practice and
allow accounting for an explicit forecast period and a subsequent steady state. This opens the
possibility of a differentiated valuation approach for the distribution of cash flows. This seems
even more desirable as the simulation results point out that share repurchases have a significant
positive effect on the equity market value in the cases of both Miles and Ezzell and Harris and
Pringle.
The third study, Valuation, personal taxes, and dividend policy under passive debt manage-
ment, focuses on the development of valuation models that account for the firm’s dividend
policy and passive debt management in an explicit forecast period and a steady state. Specifi-
cally, a blended personal tax rate at the equity investor level is derived by encapsulating all the
effects resulting from retentions and cash dividends. Concerning this matter, it remains an open
question in existing literature how the blended personal tax rate is determined and, conse-
quently, how the dividend policy affects this tax rate. By specifying the blended personal tax
rate in the third study, we can actually apply the proposed valuation models. Furthermore, the
impact of the dividend policy on the cost of equity is disclosed by deriving appropriate adjust-
ment formulas, which are similar to the known adjustment formulas under passive debt man-
agement, but they consider personal taxes. Practitioners should note that the unlevering of beta
factors assuming a steady state requires information about the cash dividend ratios of the refer-
ence companies. Conceptually, it becomes evident that the valuation models developed by
Dempsey (2017) can be converted and specified to the derived valuation models in the third
study under the assumptions of passive debt management and uniform blended personal tax
rates, which result in modified cost of equities. However, the derived valuation models in the
third study open the possibility of a more differentiated valuation approach, especially concern-
ing the effects of dividend policy on cash flows, tax shields and cost of equities. This seems
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even more desirable as the simulation results show that the value contribution of a firm’s chosen
dividend policy is far from negligible under passive debt management.
Finally, the fourth study, Unlevering and relevering with “wrong” adjustment formulas – How
bad is that?, points out the need for choosing adjustment formulas that fit the assumed financing
policy, consideration of personal taxes, forecast horizon, and default risk of debt. By using
simulations, it is shown that severe valuation errors can occur if the “wrong” adjustment for-
mula is used, which highlights the importance of using adjustment formulas that match the
actual valuation case. This might be especially helpful for valuation practitioners as they usually
apply an adjustment formula that is suitable only if the firm pursues passive debt management
and is in a steady state, wherein new investments equivalent to the depreciations are undertaken.
Thus, valuation practitioners should be more conscious about which adjustment formula to use.
6.2 Limitations and outlook
This thesis is subject to limitations, which affect all the studies presented in this thesis and first
concern the assumed financing policies. In this regard, each study considers one or both of the
idealized financing policies: passive debt management and active debt management. These two
financing policies are the two most referenced in valuation literature and practice. However,
empirical studies show that the assumption of passive or active debt management can be seen
as rather unrealistic, and managers often pursue other strategies when determining debt levels
(e.g., Graham & Harvey, 2002; Grinblatt & Liu, 2008). Accordingly, further valuation ap-
proaches try to bridge this gap by focusing on alternative financing policies (e.g., Ruback, 2002;
Kruschwitz & Löffler, 2006; Dierkes & Schäfer, 2016).
Second, this thesis oversimplifies the modeling of the effective capital gains tax rate. This over-
simplification is attributed to the fact that the thesis only makes statements about the magnitude
of the effective capital gains tax rate when compared with the cash dividend tax rate. Therefore,
in principle, how the effective capital gains tax rate is actually determined remains open. In this
respect, the level of the effective capital gains tax rate depends on many influencing variables
such as the holding period, share price growth rate, and transaction costs (Elton & Gruber, 1970;
Zhang et al., 2008). A pragmatic approach, which is used in corporate valuation practice and in
this thesis, is to set the effective capital gains tax rate as equal to half of the cash dividend tax
rate.
Third, although an earnings-based dividend policy is prevalent in practice, its integration into
DCF models is not straightforward. This results mainly because firm managers often determine
a cash dividend ratio based on earnings and not cash flows, which is generally because manag-
ers give greater weight to earnings-based rather than cash flow-based objectives (Graham et al.,
2005). Accordingly, the cash dividend ratio related to cash flows is generally stochastic and not
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deterministic, which results in mathematical concerns when determining a firm’s dividends.
Consequently, this thesis assumes a deterministic cash dividend ratio related to the cash flows
to keep the valuation models tractable. Finally, a few more general limitations cause concern,
such as the assumption of risk-free debt. It is expected that explicitly accounting for the default
risk of debt will result in even more complex valuation models.
From a theoretical perspective, further research could focus on extending the preceding analysis
using an alternative financing policy. A starting point for such an alternative financing policy
could be a focus on partially active debt management, as in Dierkes and Schäfer (2016). Fur-
thermore, financial managers are intent on maintaining a constant dividend ratio, which holds
more significance for them than capital structure choices (Baker et al., 2002). Hence, develop-
ment of a valuation model that sets its debt levels and, accordingly, its tax shields depending
on this constant dividend ratio might be a promising future research field. Moreover, different
dividend policies such as yield-oriented and value-based dividend policies might be considered
further. From an empirical perspective, an examination can be conducted on whether retained
cash flows and share repurchases affect the financial risk of a firm.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Derivation of the market value of tax shields under active debt management
To derive the market value of tax shields, we start with the expected tax shield °[ ]tE TS  as the
sum of the flow to equity and the flow to debt minus the free cash flow:
°
±( [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]) ( ( ) )
[ ]
( [ ] [ ])
( [ ]) ( ) ( [ ] [ ])
flow to equity
t t 1 t 1 t t 1 t d t g
t
g t t 1
flow to debt
t 1 b t t 1
E FCF kd E D kd E D E D E D 1 r 1 r
E TS
E E E E




∗ √ √ , √ ∗ , √ , √ , , √
<
, √ ,
∗ √ √ , , ,
κ κ
533333333333333363333333333333337




±( [ ] ( ( ) ) ( [ ] [ ]))
free cash flow
u u





Since [ ] [ ] [ ]< ,t t tE E E V E D
κ κ∃ ∃ ∃ , we get:
°
± ±
[ ] [ ] ( ( ) ) [ ] ( ( ) )
( [ ] [ ]) ( ) ( [ ] [ ])
t t 1 t d t g t 1 b t d t g
t t 1t t 1 t d g g
E TS kd E D 1 r 1 r kd E D 1 r
E D E D r E VTS E VTS .
, ,
,,
< √ √ √ , √ , , √ , √ √ , √ , , √




Following the ME valuation approach, we obtain:
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Solving equation (86) for ±[ ]
ME
t 1E VTS ,  and dividing by ( )g1,  yields:
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where ( ) ( )b g gb) < , , . Note that b)  depicts a modified personal tax rate, resulting
from the difference in personal tax rates on interests and capital gains.
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(88) holds because, due to value additivity, equation (36) can also be expressed as




t t d t g t g t 1 gu
t 1 u u
b
E FCF 1 r 1 r E E 1 E E
E E
1 kd 11 ke 1 ke
,
,
√ , √ , , √ √ , √
< ∗ ∗
∗ √ ,∗ ∗
∃ ∃
∃  , (89)
where [ ]ut 1E E ,∃  is discounted at the risk-free interest rate after personal taxes, because the mar-
ket value of the unlevered firm is known in period t 1, . Solving equation (89) for [ ]ut 1E E ,∃
yields:
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Note that the left-hand side of equation (53) and the numerator of equation (90) are identical,
and thus equation (88) holds.
Finally, equation (87) depicts the market value of tax shields in the ME case. As for the HP
case, the relevant discount rate in equation (87) is the modified cost of equity of the unlevered
firm ( uke
)
). Hence, in this case the expected market value of the tax shields, ±[ ]
HP
t 1E VTS , , is
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Appendix 2: Derivation of the adjustment formula in the ME case
Plugging equation (53) in equation (54) and solving for , ,r MEtke
)
κ  yields:
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Furthermore, by plugging equation (56) in equation (92) and collecting terms, we obtain
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Rearranging terms in equation (93) yields
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Inserting equation (87) in equation (94) and aggregating terms yields
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Finally, by collecting terms in equation (95) we obtain the cost of equity of the levered firm:
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Further simplifications yield equation (57).
80
Appendix 3: Derivation of the adjustment formula in the HP case
Until the insertion of the market value of tax shields, the derivation in the HP case is the same
as in the ME case. Inserting equation (91) into equation (94) and collecting terms yield the
corresponding adjustment formula for the cost of equity.
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Appendix 4: Derivation of the market value of tax shields over the explicit forecast period
under passive debt management
To derive the market value of tax shields, we start with the expected tax shield, °[ ]tE TS , as the
sum of the flow to equity and flow to debt minus the respective free cash flow after personal
taxes:
° ±[ ] ( [ ] ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( [ ] [ ])
( )
flow to equity after personal taxes
t t t 1 t t d t g g t t 1
flow to debt after personal taxes
t 1 b t
E TS E FCF kd D 1 D 1 r 1 r E E E E
kd D 1 D
, ,
,
< , √ √ , ∗ √ , √ , , √ , √ ,





±( [ ] ( ( ) ) ( [ ] [ ])
free cash flow after personal taxes
u u





Since [ ] [ ], , ,< ,t 1 t 1 t 1E E E V D
κ κ∃ ∃ , we get:
( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
( ) ( ) ( )
t t 1 t t d t g
t 1 b t g g t t 1
TS kd D 1 D 1 r 1 r
kd D 1 D 1 VTS VTS
,
, ,
< , √ √ , ∗ √ , √ , , √
∗ √ √ , , √ , , √ ,
. (98)
Discounting each component in (98) with ( )b1 kd 1∗ √ ,  yields:
( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
t 1 t t d t g
t 1
b
t 1 b t g g t t 1 t
b
kd D 1 D 1 r 1 r
VTS
1 kd 1





, √ √ , ∗ √ , √ , , √
<
∗ √ ,




Rearranging the terms, we obtain equation (76).
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Appendix 5: Partial Derivation of the modified tax shields in period t for
the payout ratio under passive debt management
Given equation (77), the modified tax shields *tTS  in period t  in the explicit forecast period are
determined as:
*
, , ,( ) ( )
r r r
t t 1 E t t 1 E t t E tbTS kd D 1 kd D ), ,< √ √ √ , , √ √ , , √ . (100)
The partial derivation of equation (100) for payout ratio tr  yields:
*
( ( ) ) d gt t 1 t
t g
TS kd 1 D
r 1,
,∝
< √ , √ , √
∝ ,
. (101)
Under assumption d g= , the direction of the partial derivation in (101) depends on the mag-
nitude of the change in debt market value tD  over period t . For tD 0;  (redemption of debt)
(101) is above zero and, consequently, indicates that the higher the payout ratio, tr , is, the
higher are the modified tax shields. Conversely, for positive changes in debt market value,
which fulfill ( )t t 1D kd 1 D ,= √ , √ , (101) is smaller than zero and, consequently, indicates that
the higher the payout ratio, tr , is, the lower are the modified tax shields.
As T 1 TD g D∗ < √  holds in a steady state, we can rearrange (101) to obtain:
*
( ( ) ) d gT 1 T
g
TS D kd 1 g 0
r 1
∗ ,∝ < √ √ , , √ =
∝ ,
. (102)
Typically, ( ( ) )kd 1 g 0√ , , =  holds, so that in a steady state, the higher the payout ratio, r , is,
the higher are the modified tax shields.
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Appendix 6: Derivation of the market value of tax shields in the steady state under passive
debt management
In a steady state, equation (99) can be expressed as:
( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
T T d g
T
b
T b T g g T T
b
kd D 1 g D 1 r 1 r
VTS
1 kd 1
kd D 1 g D 1 g VTS VTS 1 g
1 kd 1
, √ √ , ∗ √ √ , √ , , √
<
∗ √ ,




Solving the circularity problems, rearranging terms, and dividing the numerator and denomina-
tor by ( )g1,  yields equation (78).
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Appendix 7: Derivation of the cost of equity over the explicit forecast period under passive
debt management
Solving equation (70) for the free cash flow after blended personal taxes yields:
±
,[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]
u u u
t E t t 1 tE FCF 1 E V 1 ke E V
)
,√ , < √ ∗ ,∃ ∃ .  (104)
Furthermore, solving (74) for t1 ke
)
∗ κ  and inserting (104) yields:
,[ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]
[ ]
u u u
t 1 t t 1 t 1 t t 1 E t t
t
t 1




) , , , ,
,








Value additivity leads to:
[ ] [ ]ut t t tE V E E D VTS< ∗ ,
κ∃ ∃ . (106)
Inserting (106) in (105) and rearranging the terms yields:
,
,
( ) ( )
[ ]
( ) ( )
[ ]
u
t 1 t 1 t E tu
t
t 1
t 1 t 1 t 1 E t t
t 1
D VTS 1 ke D
ke ke
E E
kd D kd D D 1 VTS
E E
)




, √ ∗ , √
< ∗








Solving (77) for tVTS  and inserting it in (107), rearranging the terms, and multiplying with
( )g1,  finally yields (80).
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Appendix 8: Further simplification of the adjustment formula in the steady state
according to (80)
The further simplification of equation (80) yields:
±
*
( )( ( ))




Dkd 1 gke ke ke kd 1
kd 1 g E FtE ke g) ∗
√ , ,
< ∗ , √ , √ √




Note that equation (108) is independent of payout ratio r . However, (108) no longer refers to








E FtE ke g∗ ,κ
 is not observable.
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